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Intellectual Culture: The End of Russian Intelligentsia 
Dmitri Shalin  
No group cheered louder for Soviet reform, had a bigger stake in 
perestroika, and suffered more in its aftermath than did the Russian 
intelligentsia. Today, nearly a decade after Mikhail Gorbachev unveiled his 
plan to reform Soviet society, the mood among Russian intellectuals is 
decidedly gloomy. "The intelligentsia has carried perestroika on its 
shoulders," laments Ury Shchekochikhin, "so why does it feel so forlorn, 
superfluous, forgotten"? [1] G. Ivanitsky warns that the intellectual strata 
"has become so thin that in three or four years the current genocide 
against the intelligentsia would surely wipe it out." [2] Andrey Bitov, one 
of the country's finest writers, waxes nostalgically about the Brezhnev era 
and "the golden years of stagnation when . . . people could do something 
real, like build homes, publish books, and what not." [3] 
The frustration and self-doubt afflicting Russian intellectuals today might 
seem excessive but they are hardly unprecedented. In the last hundred 
sixty years or so, every crucial turn in Russian history has touched off a 
new round of debates about the intelligentsia, its role as the conscience of 
society and the guardian of national culture. This discourse by and about 
the intelligentsia has shaped Russian intellectual culture with its distinct 
themes, literary props, psychological traits, and favored political agendas. 
Russian intellectual culture shares with its Western counterpart the belief 
in directed social change and cultural critique as a tool for social 
reconstruction. East or West, intellectuals produce a "distinctive culture of 
discourse" [4] through which they stake their claim to status and income 
in a modern society. The greater the significance society assigns to the 
written word, intellectual creativity, and social criticism, the greater 
prestige and privilege the intelligentsia enjoys in society. Keeping aflame 
critical discourse and promoting high culture, therefore, the intelligentsia 
also increases its cultural capital. 
What sets Russian intellectual culture apart is a crying gap between its 
modern aspirations and the nation's conservative heritage. Its other 
distinctive feature is the bold, even extravagant, manner in which Russian 
intellectuals have asserted their vanguard role and claimed moral 
leadership in society. As Alexander Yanov, a prominent Russian 
intellectual, put it, "One advantage that Russia has over the West is its 
colossal intellectual wealth." [5] The implication is that if only the Russian 
intelligentsia could deploy its intellectual resources fully, reforms in their 
ocuntry would have a chance. This sentiment is shared by many Russian 
intellectuals who continue to search for ways to mobilize culture as a 
strategic national resource and, in the process, improve their own sinking 
fortunes. 
Whatever their vested interests, intellectuals' yen for stewardship in a 
rapidly changing Russian society should not be treated lightly. The 
ongoing discourse about the intelligentsia and its role in current reforms 
has left a mark on public consciousness and found its way into wider social 
practice. The question is where the intelligentsia would like to take the 
nation, and whether the nation is willing to follow its intelligentsia. 
To understand intellectual discourse in today's Russia , we need to 
examine Russian intellectual culture in its formative years. [6] After 
tracing the origins of the Russian intellectual tradition, I outline its 
evolution in the Soviet era. Next, I address the challenges that the 
intelligentsia faces in post-Soviet Russia , the stunning reversal of 
fortunes that Russian intellectuals have suffered in recent years, and their 
struggle to reassert their critical role in society. And finally, I offer some 
speculations about the Russian intelligentsia's future. 
The Origins of Russian Intellectual Culture 
Although the Russian intelligentsia did not evolve into a self-conscious 
social force until the mid-19th century, its origins can be traced to the 
early 18th century, when Peter the Great embarked on a crash campaign 
to modernize Russia . Backward, insular, and largely illiterate, Russia was 
to be brought abreast with the leading European nations through radical 
reforms in its political, religious, military, and civil service structures. To 
that effect, Peter I invited to Russia experts from all over Europe, sent 
young men abroad for study, set up a civil service bureaucracy, 
reorganized the army and the navy on Western models, established the 
Russian Academy of Science, and encouraged court poets to immortalize 
the Tsar's glorious deeds. This forced Westernization exposed the country 
to the ideas that had no roots in Russia proper and that were met with 
resistance from the noblemen, many of whom saw the reforms as an 
affront to Russian Orthodoxy and considered Peter the Great an anti-
Christ. But the new class of servicemen and courtiers who owed their 
fortunes to Peter the Great and his successors learned to appreciate the 
new ways and prided themselves on being the purveyors of European 
mores in their roughhewn homeland. 
It would be wrong to assume that the proto-intellectual strata planted 
during the Peter the Great's reign instantly produced Western-style 
intellectuals sold on the ideals of religious tolerance, political liberty, and a 
constitutional state. The ruthless manner in which Peter I imposed his 
reforms on his countrymen was inimical to the Occidental humanistic 
heritage with its signature belief in the dignity of every human being. Nor 
was there any evidence that the Russian servicemen, clerics, academics, 
and poets had any agenda of their own. Whatever their internal squabbles 
and personal gripes against the powerful, the 18th century bureaucrats by 
and large identified with the state, its authoritarian domestic policies and 
imperial aspirations abroad. 
As the century wore on, signs began to emerge that the Westernized 
intellectual strata was coming into its own and growing uneasy about 
Russia 's backwardness. Catherine II's interest in the French 
Enlightenment encouraged Russian writers to voice their judgments about 
the country's social and political affairs. But when some dared to shed 
their roles as official bards and court wits and venture an opinion mildly 
critical of her majesty's realm, they were sternly reprimanded by the 
Empress. Dissatisfaction with the serfdom that Vasily Kapnist cautiously 
conveyed in one of his poems was met with a rebuke from Catherine II, 
who told the writer to mind his own business and barred him from court. 
Nikolai Novikov, a prominent publisher and educator in Catherine II's 
reign, was sent to prison after he satirized Russia 's gentry. When 
Western-educated Alexander Rudishchev wrote a book lamenting the 
Russian peasants' sorry state, he was stripped of his nobleman's status 
and sentenced to death (the verdict was later changed to a life-long exile 
with the confiscation of property). [7] 
During the reign of Alexander I, the gap between autocracy and the 
Westernized strata grew wider. In 1812, Napoleon suffered a crushing 
defeat. The Russian troops triumphantly marched into Paris . As it 
happened, the occupiers fell under the spell of republicanism. Thirteen 
years later, the young military commanders attempted to overthrow the 
Tsar and replace autocracy with a constitutional monarchy -- an event 
that dramatically underscored the extent to which Western ideals 
permeated Russia 's educated class. The Decembrists' uprising, as this 
event was called, failed miserably, but in the eyes of many 
contemporaries and future commentators, it marked a watershed in 
Russian history. The 1825 coup pinpointed the growing alienation between 
Western-minded intellectuals and a nation still deeply ensconced in its 
premodern ways, and it presaged the emergence of a politically-
conscious, socially up-rooted, and increasingly radical Russian 
intelligentsia. 
The French Enlightenment, German philosophy, and early socialist 
teachings were among the most important Western currents that shaped 
Russian intellectual culture in its formative years. To the Enlightenment, 
Russian intellectuals owed their preoccupation with constitutional polity 
and the republican system of government. German philosophy left its 
mark on Russian intellectual discourse through a theory that hailed the 
world historical spirit passing through several progressive stages and 
elevating humanity to an imminently rational state. The socialist ideas 
that began to reach Russia in the 1840s furnished fresh rationales for a 
critique of Russia's backward economy and pervasive inequality. 
The term "intelligentsia" has a Latin root and the Russian grammatical 
form, suggesting a hybrid origin. George Fedotov, gives a precise date 
when the intelligentsia was born: 1837, the year Alexander Pushkin died. 
[8] Petr Boborykin claimed to have coined the term in 1866. [9] Its most 
likely source is the Hegelian philosophy of spirit which envisioned a 
superhuman intelligence operating in the universe and inexorably moving 
society toward an ever more perfect state via the rationalizing activity of 
self-reflexive minds. From this abstract philosophical doctrine, Russian 
intellectuals inferred that their country had to be modernized in line with 
world historical (read Western European) development and that the elite 
of Western-educated, publicly-minded individuals was best suited for the 
job. The Westernizers did not seem to be overly concerned that their 
schemes had hardly any moorings in the Russian political tradition. They 
had little doubt that their intelligence, theoretical savvy, and boundless 
energy will surmount the historical obstacles in their path. Hence Georgy 
Fedotov's famous definition: "The Russian intelligentsia is a group, 
movement, and tradition that is marked by the principled nature of its 
objectives and the groundlessness of its principles." [10] The arrogant 
stance that the Westernized intellectuals assumed with regard to their 
own cultural heritage had a direct impact on their psychology and 
behavior. Having sided with progress, Russian intellectuals could not help 
but feel superior to their society. With the native tradition cast as a fetter 
on their enlightened spirit, they were apt to scorn as a retrograde any 
person who saw something valuable in Russia 's past. Self-appointed 
agents of history, they treated all mundane authorities and institutions 
with contempt and vowed to destroy them. Alas, being ahead of one's 
time proved exceedingly costly, as critically thinking intellectuals 
discovered in their struggle with Russia 's formidable secrete police called 
upon to crush the enemies of the state. 
The critical intellectual ferment is already evident in Peter Chaadaev, a 
celebrated 19th century intellectual whose robust critique of Russia 's 
insular ways and longing for European culture so much angered Nicholas I 
that he pronounced Chaadaev a "madman" -- the first, though hardly the 
last, case of its kind in the Russian intelligentsia's beleaguered history. 
Taking his cue from Schelling, Chaadaev extolled "universal intelligence," 
"universal reason," "one single intellectual force in the whole universe," 
and "the unique vision of the future granted to some chosen men" whose 
selfless labors were enlisted to impart the world historical wisdom to 
reality. [11] Chaadaev's views were unabashedly elitist: I have always 
thought that humanity could advance only by following its elite, by 
following those who have the mission of leading it; . . . that the instincts 
of majorities are necessarily more egotistical, more emotional, more 
narrow . . . that human intelligence always manifests itself most 
powerfully only in the solitary mind, center and sun of its sphere. [12] 
Once the task of universal intelligence was fully comprehended, 
everything had to submit to its impersonal dictate. The individual was but 
a vehicle for divine providence, his private existence largely irrelevant in 
the face of the universal spirit's transhistorical agenda: "[T]he human 
being should be understood once and for all as an intelligent being in 
abstraction, but never as the individual and personal being, circumscribed 
by the present moment, an ephemeral insect, which is born and dies on 
the same day, and which is linked with the totality of things merely by the 
law of birth and corruption." [13] From now on, every person's objective 
value was to be judged by his readiness to subordinate his private urges 
to universal reason and to fulfill its ultimate goal. 
Having set for himself and his contemporaries this lofty ideal, Chaadaev 
quickly discovered how hard it was to live up to it. In 1836, after his 
philosophical letters incurred the Tsar's wrath, Chaadaev found himself 
hounded by the police and shunned by the public. Hastily, he renounced 
his views and retreated into proud solitude. Later on, when Alexander 
Herzen, another prominent Russian intellectual, praised Chaadaev as a 
precursor of free thought in Russia , Chaadaev dispatched a letter to the 
political police headquarters where he denounced his compatriot and in 
the most abject terms swore his loyalty to the Tsar. Asked why did he 
have to abase himself so, he replied that one simply "must save one's 
skin." [14] This surrender had its emotional toll on Chaadaev, who had 
foreseen the crushing burden that the intellectual would bear in this God-
forsaken land: "Where is the man who would be strong enough not to end 
up hating himself, living in eternal contradiction, always thinking one thing 
and doing another. . . . What causes this terrible ulcer which is destroying 
us?" [15] This "terrible ulcer" would eat away at several generations of 
Russian intellectuals daring to oppose the powerful state. Few would suffer 
more from it than Chaadaev's friend, Russia 's beloved poet, Alexander 
Pushkin. 
Educated in the state-run lyceum for noblemen, Pushkin imbibed in his 
formative years free thinking that would lead his friends to the Senate 
plaza, the famous place in St. Petersburg where the Decembrists staged 
their abortive coup. Pushkin did not mince words in his early lyrics, which 
breathed regicidal fervor: 
You, scoundrel autocratic! 
I hate thy throne and I hate thee.  
My heart feels cruelly ecstatic  
When your and your's doom I foresee. [16] 
His contemporaries remembered Pushkin in his young adulthood as an 
irreverent, Jacobin spirit who did not mince words vilifying the 
government: "At the governor's [mansion], on the streets, at the plaza, 
he was always eager to explain to anybody that he who did not want to 
change the government was a scoundrel. His conversation was replete 
with cursing and sarcasm, and even his courtesy was punctuated with an 
ironic smile." [17] Despite his radicalism, the poet's political preferences 
were rather modest: he was ready to settle for a constitutional monarchy. 
Rulers! your laurels and your crowns accrue 
To your estate from law and not from nature;  
You hover high and mighty over nations,  
Alas, eternal law reigns over you [18]. 
Even in the liberal reign of Alexander II (the Tsar himself at one point 
toyed with the idea of constitutional monarchy), such rhetoric was 
deemed to be highly inflammatory. The Tsar had little use for a poet who 
dared to put him on notice that 
I cannot force my bashful muse  
Tsars and their courtiers to amuse. [19] 
Pushkin's verses, widely circulated and popular among future 
Decembrists, landed him in exile, from which the poet would not escape 
until after the failed Decembrists' uprising. 
After Alexander I died in 1825, his son, Nicholas I, ascended to the 
throne. Before he brought Pushkin back from exile, he ordered him, along 
with a few other free thinkers, to write a report on the linkage between 
youth education and pernicious republicanism, effectively inviting the poet 
to repent for his own youthful indiscretions. Pushkin's reply was 
emblematic of the torturous exercises that Russian intellectuals would 
have to go through to save their skins without completely dishonoring 
themselves. He charged his friends with "criminal delusions" and "low 
morals," blamed "foreign ideologism" and "deficient education" for their 
"wanton behavior," called for "drastic measures" to stem free thinking 
among Russian youth, and demanded "the end to home schooling" which 
lets youngsters escape the state's "omniscient oversight. [20] At the same 
time, he intimated that harsh censorship might have driven honorable 
men to clandestine publications, that it was better to expose the youth to 
republican ideas in school than make them yield to hostile agitation later 
on, and that the person's rank in society ought to be made commensurate 
with his education -- quite nonorthodox ideas, given the period's 
reactionary tenore. 
About the same time, as if to calm his guilty conscience, Pushkin wrote 
one of his best known verses which he dedicated to his comrades exiled to 
Siberia: 
Deep down in the Siberian mines  
Sustain your proud, silent patience,  
Your anguished toil will slowly grind,  
Your noble dreams won't vanish traceless. 
Confidently, Pushkin predicted that the time would come when 
Your heavy fetters will fall off,  
The walls of prisons crumble -- and freedom  
Will greet you at the gates,  
As friends restore your swords to you. [21] 
These words are familiar to all Soviet school children. Much less known is 
Pushkin's other side, his secret dealings with the authorities, his endless 
entreaties to the chef of Russia's secret police: "If the emperor wishes to 
use my pen, I would be eager, according to my abilities and with requisite 
precision, to fulfill his highness's will. . . . I offer my magazine to the 
government -- as its tool for shaping public opinion." [22] And this is from 
the man who confessed that he was "tired to depend on the good or bad 
digestion of one superior or another. . . . The only thing I crave is 
independence." [23] And again: "What a devil's jest to force me, with my 
mind and talent, to be born in Russia!" [24] "Of course, I loath my 
homeland from head to toe, though I feel annoyed when a foreigner 
shares with me this feeling. But you, who is not on the leash," queried 
Pushkin his friend, "how can you live in Russia ? If the Tsar granted me 
freedom, I wouldn't stay a month around here." [25] No wonder that 
trying to reconcile these conflicting sentiments, Pushkin became ill-
tempered and depressed. The freedom from political demands was all an 
artist should long for, according to mature Pushkin. Here is his much 
quoted verse written in the poet's last year that sums up his 
disillusionment: 
I do not cherish your much touted rights  
Which sets some heads to reeling.  
I don't blame the Gods who have denied me  
The sweet pleasure of disputing taxes and meddling 
With tsars forever waging wars among themselves.  
Why should I care if our press is free  
To gull its readers, if watchful censorship  
Thwarts noisy demagogues' ambitious designs.  
All these, you see, are words, words, words.  
Far better, nobler rights are dear to me;  
Far more auspicious freedoms I am craving:  
To bow to the Tsar, to bow to the people --  
What difference does it make? God be their judge.  
 
To no one else  
Accounting for my deeds, pleasing no other but myself,  
Refusing for a prize to bend my neck, my conscience, my beliefs,  
Wandering here and there as I alone see fit,  
Standing in awe, admiring nature's sacred beauty,  
Beholding artistry inspired flight, transfixed  
In joy and gratitude by its eternal truth --  
Now, that is happiness! Those are the rights. . . .[26] 
Toward the end of his life, Pushkin grew increasingly irritated with his old 
friends and unhappy about the real and imaginary slights he had suffered 
from Nicholas I and his servants who never believed in his conversion. 
Several times he offered to resign from his lowly position in the court 
hierarchy, but was discouraged to go through with his request. A 
notorious skirt chaser, he found the tables turned on himself when 
Georges Dantes, a dazzling Frenchman serving in the Russian army, 
began to stalk his wife. The duel that followed left Pushkin mortally 
wounded. On his deathbed, he pleaded with Nicholas I to forgive his 
indiscretion, asking his friend Zhukovsky to "tell him that it's a pity I have 
to die; I would have been his completely." [27] The autocrat struck a 
noble pause, forgiving Pushkin his sins against the throne, paying off his 
numerous debts, and promising to take care of his wife and children. The 
foremost poet and intellectual of his time, Alexander Pushkin died a 
broken man. 
The First Intelligenty 
Neither Chaadaev nor Pushkin saw themselves as intelligenty -- members 
of the Russian intelligentsia. Both were firmly rooted in the estate system 
and harbored class prejudices against the lower orders common at the 
time. Most contemporary Westernizers resigned themselves to studying 
the latest foreign theories among like-minded nobles. Stankevich, 
Granovsky, Turgenev, Ogarev, Herzen -- the golden youth of the 1840's 
gathered in small circles where free thinking continued to flourish in the 
stifling atmosphere of Nicholas I rule. "What is, is right," pronounced the 
reigning Hegelian wisdom, from which the Russian intellectuals concluded 
that they must be patient, that universal spirit cannot be rushed, that no 
order was ready to fall until it had exhausted its historical potential. 
The revolutionary tide that swept Europe in the late 1840s washed on the 
Russian shores socialist slogans which exploded Russia 's stagnant 
culture. The case of Alexander Herzen, the brilliant socialist writer and one 
of Russia 's first political exiles to the West, is most revealing here. Son of 
a Russian nobleman and a wealthy French woman, Herzen was schooled 
at his father's estate in a typically eclectic fashion, learning Latin, German 
and French, reading Voltaire and Diderot, soaking up the republican spirit. 
He enrolled at Moscow State University , where he joined a clique of youth 
looking for ways to snub Russia 's hated institutions. The young men's 
aversion to autocracy was awakened by the Decembrists' uprising and 
fortified by the heavy dosage of Fourierism and Saint Simonism. In 1834, 
the student group was exposed and its leaders exiled to the East, where 
Herzen spent eight years, working in various provincial administrations 
and learning more than he cared to about Russia 's retrograde customs. 
After a return to Moscow engineered by his powerful friends, Herzen was 
exiled one more time, came back again, and in 1847, under the pretext of 
his wife's poor health, managed to leave Russia and never returned to his 
homeland. 
Residing alternatively in Switzerland, France, Italy, and finally London, he 
took active part in the revolutionary upheavals that swept Europe from 
1848 on, and in the process underwent what he called "perestroika of all 
convictions." [28] He rejected German idealism as too abstract and 
consecrated himself to socialism and materialism, convinced that science 
and education could alleviate absolutism, foster equality, and deliver 
humanity from its misery. While Herzen's passion for liberalism sometime 
approached religious fervor, his caustic, brilliant mind continued to check 
his intellections against reality, openly acknowledging wherever the 
former exceeded his expectations: 
Liberalism is the last religion , though its church is not other-worldly and 
its theodicy is political; it stands firmly on the ground and allows no 
mystical reconciliations; it has to reconcile itself with reality in deed. . . . 
Liberalism exposed the chasm in all its nakedness; the sickly 
consciousness of this chasm breeds irony and skepticism that mark the 
modern man and help him sweep the remnants of past idols. Irony 
conveys the disappointment that logical truth is not the same as historical 
truth, that aside from dialectical development, truth has its passionate 
and contingent development, that in addition to reason, truth also has its 
romance. [29] 
In the mid-50s, Herzen started a successful publishing venture, which 
included his famous magazines "Kolokol" (The Bell) and "Voices from 
Russia " where intellectuals could clandestinely publish their philippics 
against the Tsarist state. The magazine issues were smuggled back to 
Russia where they were widely read by the regime's proponents and 
opponents, with the top courtiers boasting their familiarity with the latest 
magazine articles. Herzen was among the very first in Russia to zero in 
on glasnost as a pivot on which progressive reforms must turn. "Thanks to 
censorship, we are unfamiliar with glasnost, which amazes, frightens, and 
offends us. It is time for the comedians from the imperial secret police to 
realize that sooner or later their actions, kept secret behind bars and 
buried in cemeteries, will become known and their shameful deeds will be 
revealed in their utter ugliness to the entire world." [30] This will be the 
central theme of Herzen's magazine throughout its life span. "If we listen 
carefully to public opinion," wrote an anonymous contributor to the first 
issue, "we hear one demand: glasnost. If you read the underground 
literature, we come across the same demand: glasnost. Now every fact 
points out that the only way to fight today's evil is glasnost. . . . The 
choice is between these two options: cruelty and glasnost. . . ." [31] 
Herzen's own belief in the power of glasnost and enlightenment remained 
unshaken throughout his life, but his hope to see liberal ideas triumph in 
his lifetime gradually faded away. He was also profoundly disaffected with 
the West and its bourgeois culture -- meshchanstvo, as the Russians 
would call it contemptuously. All of Europe , in his estimation, split into 
two competing and equally philistine camps: "[O]n the one hand, there 
are philistine-proprietors anxious to hold on to their monopolies, on the 
other -- propertyless philistines (meshchane), which strain to dispossess 
their counterparts but do not have enough strength. That is to say, greed 
on the one side, envy on the other." [32] So, there seemed to be little 
hope for a rational, humane community anywhere in the world. As his 
hopes waned, Herzen grew ironic, wistful, and sarcastic, as so many of his 
Russian contemporaries who had placed stock in reason only to discover 
that reality refused to submit to its dictates. Herzen's irritability and 
unhappiness was exacerbated by personal misfortunes and family 
problems, as well as generational shifts. The new crop of Russian 
intellectuals found him too liberal and conciliatory. Indeed, toward the end 
of his life, Herzen renounced revolutionary violence as inimical to 
constructive social change. He did it just as the mood back home was 
turning more belligerent. Herzen's final judgments read as a warning to 
the coming generation of freedom fighters who failed to understand that 
"civilization by the whip, liberation by the guillotine," would spell new a 
tyranny: "Every cause that requires crazy, mystic, and fantastic means 
will in the end breed crazy consequences along with the reasonable ones. 
Clearly, this is not our path -- understanding and discussion are our only 
weapon." [33] 
Herzen's social origins and considerable family fortune might have 
something to do with his political moderation. But for his successors who 
could boast neither his pedigree nor his financial resources, moderation in 
the fight for freedom and equality was no virtue. The new breed of 
intellectuals known as raznochintsy (literally, people from different ranks) 
came from diverse social and economic strata. The sons and daughters of 
clergy, servicemen, teachers, or gentry -- one thing all these people had 
in common was that they severed most of their ties with their social strata 
and often maintained a threadbare economic existence. It is this new crop 
of declasse intellectuals who came into their own in the 1850s and 
blossomed in the 1860s that was for the first time identified as "the 
Russian intelligentsia." While paying homage to their predecessors and 
borrowing from them some insights, the new intellectuals spurned 
noblemen-critics as dreamers, lost souls, or "superfluous people" 
[34] incapable of linking their thoughts and deeds. Pushkin was for them 
"not serious enough," "too much of an epicurean," "too harmonious by 
nature to take on life's anomalies." [35] Ivan Turgenev, another nobleman 
writer with liberal sensibilities and a penchant for compromise, also found 
himself shunned by the progressively militant intellectuals. 
Vissarion Belinsky, Nikolai Dobroliubov, Nikolai Chernyshevsky, and Dmitri 
Pisarev are key figures who perfected an intellectual style that would 
dominate high culture discourse in Russia until the early 20th century. 
Here are some key themes and accents that marked their discourse and 
gave Russian intellectual culture its unique historical flavor: 
(1). A critical approach to every social event or institution that is judged 
from the standpoint of how it fits into the progressive historical agenda. 
(2). A moral maximalism or an expectation that 
the intelligenty subordinate their private needs to public interests, treat 
every person according to his contribution to the liberation process, and 
do everything possible to hasten the arrival of a just society. 
(3). A vanguardism that calls upon a few educated, conscientious, 
critically-minded individuals to lead the toiling masses toward the final 
battle against the oppressive and obsolete regime. 
(4). An ideologically inspired compassion for the toiling classes and 
oppressed groups who suffered under the autocratic regime without being 
able to voice their grievances or understand what causes their pains. 
(5). A programmatic commitment to political, social, and economic 
equality as the historically most efficient and humane form of societal 
existence. 
(6). A readiness to resort to class violence as a necessary evil under the 
conditions where the reactionary state suppresses glasnost and stifles 
legitimate venues for social reconstruction. 
(7). A split between word and deed, with the free word persecuted by the 
defensive authorities acquiring the status of the ultimate deed. 
(8). An ironic detachment in interpersonal relations and sarcastic attitude 
toward all authorities, which highlighted the gap between the official roles 
that the Russian intellectuals had to play in public and the ideal selves 
they aspired to be. 
(9). A principled opposition to bourgeois culture or meshchanstvo in all its 
manifestations found in contemporary family life, relations between 
friends, artistic tastes, etc. 
(10). An exalted vision of art and literature as a powerful medium for 
shaping public opinion and communicating to the masses socialist ideals 
and ideologically sound attitudes toward the extant society. 
This list is not exhaustive; a particular stylistic feature could be present or 
absent in any given individual; but somewhere at the intersection of these 
discursive traits emerged the 19th century intelligentsia's creed. The 
change in the Russian intellectual style could be gleaned from 
Dobroliubov's celebrated dictum: 
[T]he mass of people who 'think that they are above the present reality' is 
swelling year by year; perhaps, everybody will soon outgrow this reality. 
[But] what we need now are not people who would 'raise us above reality' 
but who would raise -- or teach us how to raise -- the very reality to the 
level of the rational demands we make. In a word, we need people of 
action and not just those withdrawn, epicurean, bent on theorizing 
individuals. [36] 
There was no consensus at the time, or for that matter at any other point 
in Russian history, as to how reality could be brought in line with reason. 
But the notion that political means alone might not suffice in bringing 
about an emancipated society sank roots at this historical juncture. Take 
Vissarion Belinsky, an iconic figure among the Russian intelligenty. He 
started as a moderately conservative idealist, gradually moved toward left 
Hegelianism with its maxim -- What is rational must be made actual, then 
fell under the spell of Saint Simonism, and finally declared himself a social 
radical. "The entire public foundation of our age requires a painstaking 
review and radical perestroika," wrote Belinsky in 1840, and this 
necessitates violence as a tool for social engineering: "It is ridiculous to 
believe that [social change] could happen by itself, in a timely fashion, 
without violent uprisings and bloodshed. People are so stupid that they 
must be lead to happiness by force. . . . I am beginning to love mankind 
according to Marat: to make the least part of it happy I seem to be ready 
to destroy the rest of it with fire and sword." [37] 
One should resist the temptation of reading too much into such 
inflammatory rhetoric (Belinsky was no more bloodthirsty than the young 
Pushkin). It must be judged against the backdrop of Nicholas I's 
suffocating empire where every independent thought was met with police 
crackdown, every free spirit faced ostracism and repression. To be sure, 
Belinsky was exaggerating when he wrote, "I am mortified by this 
spectacle of a society in which leading roles are given to scoundrels and 
perfect mediocrities, while everything noble and talented is hauled away 
to rot on an uninhabited island," [38] but he was no malicious slanderer, 
and he certainly expressed an opinion current among his educated 
contemporaries. We should also balance the intelligentsia's radical 
declarations with its commitment to glasnost, art, and literature as vital to 
social progress -- the commitment shared by nearly all Russian 
intellectuals, even those strenuously opposed to violence, up until the late 
1980's. "For us, the Russians," wrote Chernyshevsky, "literature and 
poetry have a tremendous importance that is not matched anywhere in 
the world. . . ." [39] The significance that the intelligenty assigned to 
literature in the 1850's and 60's was far greater than the role they 
reserved for violence. 
For the public, literature is not something that makes it forget life's 
worries, not a sweet daydreaming in comfortable chairs after a fat meal -- 
no, from the standpoint of the public, literature is res publica, a public 
cause, a great deed, the source of moral joy and exaltation. . . . Where 
there is a public, the writing has national content. . . . Where there is a 
public, there is public opinion. [40] 
The mid-19th century intelligentsia's contribution to the cause of freedom 
was mostly through literary criticism, which was just about the only semi-
legitimate (censorship remained strict throughout the 19th century) form 
of critical discourse possible at the time. It is through a painstaking, 
sometimes forced, occasionally brilliant critique of literary works, theater 
performances, music events, painting exhibits, etc., that the Russian 
public learned how to glean the Zeitgeist in artist's work. Through the 
eyes of Belinsky, Dobroliubov, Chernyshevsky, and Pisarev, many loyal 
Russians came to see corrupt state officials brought to life by Gogol's 
satirical imagination, to empathize with the yearnings of superfluous 
people like Lermontov's Pechorin and Ostrovsky's Oblomov, to discern the 
new hard-edged intellectuals exemplified by Turgenev's Bazarov or 
Chernyshevsky's Rakhmetov. The last type is particularly interesting, for it 
embodied the qualities that Russian intellectuals valued in themselves. 
"Rakhmetov can do without what is called personal happiness," wrote 
Pisarev about a revolutionary hero pictured in Chernyshevsky's novel 
"What is to be Done"; "he has no need to refresh his strength through a 
woman's love, pleasant music, Shakespearian play, or a festive supper 
with good friends. He has one weakness: a good cigar which he needs to 
clear his thoughts. But even this pleasure is but a means for him: he 
smokes not because he enjoys smoking but because smoking stimulates 
his mental activity." [41] What is remarkable about such statements that 
proliferated in this era is their cultivated ascetism and emotional self-
repression. There seemed to be no room left for private feelings in the 
Russian intelligentsia's moral calculus; a person was not to be judged on 
any other basis than his ideological convictions. We already saw a hint of 
this antipersonalism in Chaadaev (though not in Pushkin, the 
quintessential humanist!) who urged that the individual was but an 
"abstraction" and "ephemeral insect" devoid of significance apart form his 
preassigned place in the world historical drama. One senses even a 
greater stringency in the self-imposed rigors of the intelligentsia. "The 
death of the particular for the sake of the universal -- such is the universal 
law," intoned Belinsky. "From now on, man is nothing for me; man's 
beliefs are everything. Conviction is the only thing that can unite me with 
people or turn me away from them." [42] 
You need not be a psychiatrist to suspect that such vociferous opposition 
to the private sphere and personal pleasures had something to do with the 
profound emotional disturbances hobbling Russian intellectuals. This 
emotional rigorism could be traced in part to the hiatus between the harsh 
realities spawned by quasi-modern Russia and intellectuals' longing for 
illusive Western liberties, between the communal bliss promised by 
socialist theories and the punishing discipline imposed on recalcitrant 
individuals by the Tsarist regime. Hence, the moralism, defensiveness, 
self-loathing, and sarcasm directed toward everyone and everything 
working for the status quo. 
I find Herzen's testimony especially moving here. His passion for justice 
never throttled his instinct for truth, his demanding attitude toward others 
did not blind him to his personal shortcomings. His humanism is nowhere 
more evident than in his brutally honest self-indictment where he 
ruminates on the price he and his loved ones had to pay for his endless 
struggles and sacrifices. 
We were born to destroy, our business was to weed and tear down, and 
for that purpose [we had to] negate and ironize -- but even now, after we 
struck fifteen-twenty blows, we see that we built nothing, that we 
educated nobody. The consequence -- or to put it bluntly -- punishment -- 
can be seen in people surrounding us, in the relations inside our families -
- and most of all, in our children. [43] 
Herzen's self-irony would be carried out by his successors into stinging 
sarcasm and intolerance toward anyone who did not share their 
convictions. Herzen spotted this personal style in the Russian intellectuals 
who visited him abroad, such as Engelson and Nechaev, as well as his 
fellow immigrant, Mikhail Bakunin. Here is his take on the Petrashevtsy, a 
socialist circle busted by the Russian secret police in 1849: 
This circle included people who were young, gifted, extremely clever and 
educated, but also irritable, sickly, and broken. . . . Young emotions, 
bright and cheerful in their origins, were pushed inside and replaced with 
pride and jealous competitiveness. . . . They did not know what happiness 
was, did not care to nurture it. Under the mildest pretext they struck back 
ruthlessly and treated the people closest to them rudely. They did as 
much damage and spoiled as many things with their irony as Germans did 
with their sugary sentimentality." [44] 
Needless to say, not all intelligenty personalized such qualities. Still, there 
is enough evidence to be gleaned from their diaries, correspondence, and 
writings to corroborate Herzen's testimony. [45] Bred into their bones and 
calcified there, the rage against autocracy drove the intelligenty toward 
endless self-sacrifices and martyrdom, but it also disfigured their personal 
lives, cost happiness to their loved ones, and left a trail of bitterness in its 
wake that no hope for a better future could erase. 
Soul-Searching and Self-criticism Among Intellectuals 
By the time the 1860s came to a close, Russian intellectual culture 
acquired its familiar traits and every educated person aspiring to be 
anintelligent started feeling its powerful pull. There was still the question 
to be answered as to how Russian reality could be brought in line with 
perceived historical demands. The intelligenty offered to lead the way, but 
who would heed the call? According to one Decembrist, "a party of 
masked men" pouncing on the regal cortege would suffice to set Russia on 
its modern path. But as Mikhail Lunin (the memorable phrase was his) and 
the Decembrists learned, remonstrating on the Senate plaza was not 
nearly enough. 
Then came the familiar saw: the toiling masses -- the people -- must be 
roused and turned loose against their oppressors. In the 1870s, the young 
populists took to the countryside where they tried to persuade the 
peasants that their conditions were much too harsh and that they ought to 
rise and make their voice heard. The people were to be lead by "the 
critically thinking personality that understood itself as a possible and 
necessary agent of human progress." [46] The populist campaign was the 
first concerted attempt to foment revolution in Russia. Alas, it failed even 
more ignominiously than the Decembrists' reckless gamble. The masses 
did not know what to make of the populists' clamorous agitation. Rebelling 
against the Tsar, the protector of Russian Orthodox Church, seemed to 
many blasphemous. No wonder that some populists were turned in to the 
police by the very people they swore to liberate. A handful of intellectuals 
were executed, many ended up in jails or in Siberian exile, feeding an 
image -- popular or sinister depending on one's bias -- of a young 
freedom fighter/nihilist sacrificing his life in the struggle for people's 
happiness. 
Disgusted with such political turpitude and embittered by the secret 
police's brutal response to their propaganda, the intelligenty sought to 
regroup. Some hot heads gave up on spreading the word altogether and 
resorted to propaganda by deed: bombing the royal family, assassinating 
state officials, sabotaging official institutions. Dmitri Karakozov's 
unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Alexander II in 1866 opened up a 
new chapter in the intelligentsia's struggle with Russian Tsarism. 
However, by the time the splintering populist organization, the "people's 
will," managed to track and assassinate Alexander II, the public mood in 
Russia swung to the right. 
As we saw earlier, intellectual culture in Russia received an impetus from 
Peter the Great's crash campaign to Westernize Russian society. 
Radicalintelligenty were very well aware of this connection. According to 
Chernyshevsky, it is the task for a critically-minded intellectual, artist or 
writer "to facilitate in every way possible Peter the Great's cause." 
[47] Yet, just as the Westernizers lurched toward socialism and 
materialism via left Hegelianism, another faction -- the Slavophiles -- 
unfurled their banners heralding Russia 's cultural superiority and its 
unique path among the European nations. Aleksei Khomiakov, Ivan 
Kireevsky, Fedor Tiutchev, Ivan and Konstantin Aksakov belonged to this 
influential group whose members saw the country's past as laden with 
religious archetypes bearing good tidings for Russia 's future. What the 
Westernizers considered to be signs of backwardness -- week legal state, 
abridged personal freedom, rudimentary market, constricted property 
relations -- the Slavophiles hailed as the country's traditional strength in 
which every Russian should take pride. To the Western preoccupation with 
the law, the Slavophiles juxtaposed the Russian concern for the ethically 
guided action; the Russian peasants' preference for communal living, they 
argued, was loftier than European individualism inspired by arrogant 
humanism; the aversion to private property and competition underscored 
the Russian peasants' immunity to bourgeois culture. Even the obedience 
to the Tsar and his servants' harsh orders revealed the loyalty and 
patience of Russia 's long-suffering people. This patriotic exegesis that 
envisioned Russian culture as a cut above any Western European model 
was vividly rendered in Leo Tolstoy's novel War and Peace. [48] There 
was a message for the intelligentsia in these Slavophile musings: stop 
imitating the West, cease leading Russia into the abyss, learn from the 
Russian people. As Konstantin Leontiev, a staunch conservative and a 
dye-in-the-wool Slavophile put it, "[H]e who understands how vitally 
important the cultural, national style is for our state, what a saving grace 
it could be for the Slavs to shed the mental yoke of Europe, must wish not 
to enhance the intelligentsia's impact on the simple folk, but quite to the 
contrary -- he must look for the best and easiest ways to emulate the 
muzhik." [49] 
The Slavophiles's nationalism was laced with irony, for the 19th century 
Russian patriots owed as big a debt of gratitude to European thought as 
did Westernizers. Slavophilism was propelled into being by the romantic 
reaction to the French revolution as exemplified by Joseph de Maistre (he 
lived in Russia for a while and his words and writings enjoyed considerable 
influence here) and it was especially indebted to the latter Shelling. This 
eminent German philosopher spurned the Enlightenment and rationalism, 
elevated the mystical and irrational intuition as the surest way to discern 
divine will, and enjoined each Folk to carry out God's commandments in 
its own inimitable fashion. Still, it should be stressed that, unlike their 
ultra-conservative followers, the original Slavophiles did not deny other 
nations their special place in world history and urged their countrymen to 
appreciate other people's customs. The point was to find a proper balance 
between the national and the world historical: 
[T]he advocates of Western Europe tout exclusively the European national 
form [narodnost] which they endow with world historical significance and 
in the name of which they deprive the Russian people the right to the 
universally human [obshchechelovecheskoe]. . . . But who said that the 
national view [narodnoe vozzrenie] rules out the universal human view? 
Quite to the contrary. We say English literature, French literature, German 
literature, Greek literature, and that does not bother us. . . . Why not 
grant the same right to the Russians? . . . To deny the Russian people the 
right to its own national view is to hold them back from partaking in the 
world historical cause. [50] 
A great Russian writer, Fedor Dostoyevsky, articulated a similar view in 
his famous "Pushkin speech" in which he tried to reconcile the 
Westernizers and Slavophiles. The speech was given on June 8, 1880 , in 
connection with the dedication of a monument to Pushkin. [51] It belongs 
to the venerable Russian tradition, still very much alive, that seeks to 
fathom Pushkin's legacy for the present time, i.e., to decipher the 
cultural/political message to posterity embedded in Pushkin's literary 
corpus. In Dostoyevsky's exegesis, Pushkin went through three stages in 
his career: (1) the wandering period, where he acted and wrote as a 
typical Russian intellectual seeking to escape oppressive Russian 
institutions and find solace in a foreign tradition; (2) the nativist period, 
where a mature Pushkin discovered that peace is not to be found outside 
the country's borders but in Russian popular culture, in its rich heritage of 
fairy tales, cultural masterpieces, and the imperial glory secured for the 
nation by Peter the Great and his successors; (3) the synthetic period, 
where wise Pushkin summoned his genius to fuse the native tradition with 
the cultural riches of other nations. In his talk, Dostoyevsky warned the 
intelligentsia ("the Russian wanderers") that it must reclaim its national 
roots or risk becoming an albatross around the country's neck. "Humble 
yourself, proud man; first and foremost break your pride. Humble 
yourself, idle man; first and foremost come and toil on your homeland's 
soil." [52] Countering the rising tide of political violence, Dostoyevsky 
deployed his celebrated argument against cruel means as inimical to 
genuine social reconstruction: 
Let's try to imagine that you are erecting a building that in the end would 
secure happiness for the entire human race, would guarantee people 
peace and security at last. Imagine, also, that for that purpose you have 
to torture to death just one human being -- maybe even not a very good 
person, the one who might appear down right ridiculous to some. . . . 
Would you consent to be an architect in such an undertaking and remain 
forever happy . . . if in the foundation of the building there is the suffering 
of just one, even if only the pettiest, being ruthlessly and unjustly tortured 
to death? [53] 
What makes the Russians different and what Pushkin's genius revealed 
beyond reasonable doubt, according to Dostoyevsky, was that his 
countrymen were endowed with the rare ability to empathize with the pain 
and suffering of the entire humanity: 
Yes, the calling of the Russian person is undoubtedly all-European and 
universal. . . . Oh, European nations -- they do not even know how they 
are dear to us! I believe that in the future we, or rather our successors, 
future Russian people, will understand to the last person that to be a true 
Russian means this: to strive to bring about a final reconciliation of 
European contradictions, to alleviate the European angst in our universal 
and all-embracing Russian soul, to absorb [vmestit] in it our brethren with 
the brotherly love, and ultimately, perhaps to say a final word about the 
great universal harmony, the brotherly agreement among all tribes that 
live according to Christian evangelic law." [54] 
The great novelist's exegesis might have been flawed (as we saw earlier, 
Pushkin never completely surrendered his wandering spirit), but 
Dostoyevsky rightly sensed a new movement afoot in his land. Indeed, 
the public was ready to believe that "all our slavophilism and westernism 
is but one great confusion, albeit a necessary one." [55] With the radical 
intelligentsia losing its monopoly on high cultural discourse, the 
intelligentsia began to split into competing camps. Radical intellectuals 
included the old-style populists, anarchists, social democrats, social 
revolutionists, and since the early 20th century, the Bolsheviks. The liberal 
camp was mostly inhabited by Zemstvo activists who came from local 
administrations elected by popular vote from different social strata 
following Alexander II's cautious political reforms. Moderate conservatives 
with religious interests centered around the "Vekhi" group, whose leading 
representatives -- Nikolai Berdiaev, Petr Struve, and Sergei Bulgakov -- 
grew away from Marxism while remaining committed to personal freedom 
and parliamentary institutions. There was also the rightist faction, 
represented by Pobedonostsev, Leontiev, and their clones, which 
championed ultra nationalist causes and encouraged the black hundreds 
movement sworn to stamp out foreign influence and eradicate the left. 
Any account of this period would be incomplete without mentioning Anton 
Chekhov, a famous playwright and short story writer. The sickly, 
somewhat reclusive man commanded respect from nearly all intellectual 
factions in Russia, even though left- and right-wing intellectuals felt 
uneasy about his politically noncommittal stance. Chekhov decried 
"partisanship and cliquishness" which dominated the contemporary 
cultural scene and which he found inimical to creativity and fairness: "I 
fear those who search between my lines in the hope to discover some 
tendency and pronounce me a liberal or a conservative. I am not a liberal, 
a conservative, a gradualist, a monk, or an indifferentist. . . . My sacred 
creed is human body, health, wit, talent, inspiration, love, and absolute 
freedom, the freedom from violence and lies whichever form the latter 
might take. [56] Chekhov's resentment toward the partisan intelligentsia 
nagging him to choose between political camps would show more of an 
edge with time. This is what he had to say about left-wing intellectuals a 
few years before he died: "I do not believe in our intelligentsia, 
mendacious, sanctimonious, hysterical, bad-mannered, lazy -- do not 
believe it even when it complains and pines away, for its oppressors come 
from its very depth. I believe only in separate individuals, whether they 
are intelligenty or muzhiki, for they are a real force, even if a small one." 
[57] 
The first sentence from this passage has been quoted ad infinitum and 
remains as popular among today's critics of Russian intelligentsia as it was 
early in the century. Yet, it is apt to be misinterpreted as a blanket 
condemnation of all Russian intellectuals. In fact, Chekhov's views were 
far more differentiated and complex. His writings are filled with passages 
where he praises the intelligentsia's selfless work and forthright attitudes. 
[58]More importantly, the commentators tend to overlook that Chekhov's 
revolt against the intelligentsia represented a revolutionary turn toward 
civic virtues vital to a civilized society the Russian intellectuals professed 
to endorse. Poriadochnost and intelligentnost are two terms that, following 
Chekhov, the Russians would use to denote the new attitudes that 
the intelligenty must cultivate in themselves and display in all life's 
circumstances. Both words refer to a person who is trustworthy in his 
dealings, respects people regardless of their status, strives to do justice to 
an opponent's argument, displays professionalism in his work, and seeks 
to practice what he preaches. The intelligenty who embody these social 
qualities possess moral intelligence -- a trait by no means confined to 
people with educational credentials, white-color workers, artists, etc., but 
widely spread throughout the population. Moral intelligence is not a badge 
of honor that, once awarded, could be proudly displayed on any occasion: 
it is a claim to be redeemed, an ongoing accomplishment, an identity that 
is good only until further notice. Raising oneself from the depraved 
conditions and becoming a morally intelligent person -- such is an 
ideology that Chekhov bequeathed to his countrymen, particularly those 
aspiring to join the ranks of the intelligentsia: 
What if you write a story about a young man, son of a serf, ex-shop-
keeper, a high school and college student, brought up to honor the rank, 
to slobber over priests' hands, to jenuflex before other people's thoughts, 
who gave thanks for every piece of bread he received, was whipped 
repeatedly, walked through wet streets in leaking shoes, engaged in 
fights, tormented pets, loved to dine with rich relatives, casually lied to 
God and people just because he felt his nothingness -- write how this 
young man is squeezing a slave out of himself, drop by drop, and how one 
glorious day he wakes up and realizes that not the slave's blood is 
coursing through his veins but real human blood. [59] 
Chekhov's influence would be felt in many subsequent debates about the 
intelligentsia. A new element in these debates was the strong accent 
onintelligentnost ("moral intelligence" is the best translation I could think 
of here) as a trait distinguishing genuine intelligenty, on the intelligentsia 
as an ethical rather than a socio-economic category. Ivanov-Razumnik 
highlighted this usage in his widely read history of the Russian 
intelligentsia's political activism, where he censured those who "equate 
every 'educated' person with the representative of the intelligentsia, 
forgetting that no educational certificate can in and of itself turn an 
'educated' person into an intelligent." [60] Tugan-Baranovsky meant very 
much the same thing when he wrote that "the term 'intelligentsia' is 
commonly used here to connote not so much a socio-economic as socio-
moral category." [61] 
Characteristically, intellectuals with disparate political agendas sought to 
appropriate Chekhov's legacy for their cause: those on the right quoted 
approvingly his harsh words about the intelligentsia, while those left of 
center recited his paeans to civic virtues. We can see this in two influential 
volumes that appeared a few years after the revolutionary upheavals of 
1905-1907 shattered the Tsarist authorities' confidence and forced them 
into political concessions. One was published in 1909 by several religiously 
oriented writers under the heading Guideposts. Essays on the Russian 
Intelligentsia; the other, The Intelligentsia in Russia, was assembled a 
year later by liberals as a response to Guideposts (in Russian -- Vekhi). 
The first opus opened up with a frontal attack on the Russian intellectual 
tradition. Nikolai Berdiaev used the derogative 
term intelligentshchina(rabid intellectualism) to disparage Russian 
intellectuals for their "cliquishness," "extreme emotionalism," "political 
despotism," and "artificial isolation from national life" -- the qualities that, 
according to Berdiaev and his colleagues, incited the bloody confrontations 
between workers and the authorities. [62] Petr Struve condemned radical 
intellectuals who breathed "arrogance and haughtiness" and showed 
"intolerance to dissident." Such intellectuals like to strike "the proud and 
offensive pose of a savior," to contrast themselves to "obyvateli" or down-
to-earth citizens preoccupied with their daily routines; yet, their reckless 
agitation and aversion to work through normal political venues 
precipitated chaos and bloodshed. [63] The intelligentsia displayed 
religious fervor in its political pursuits, but its "asceticism" and "vacuous 
heroism" was the obverse of "patient selfless work" [podvizhnichestvo] 
expected from a devout Christian, in as much as the bellicose intellectuals 
paid only lip service to "the notion of people's equal worthiness, of the 
absolute dignity of every human personality." [64] 
In a piece titled "The Ethics of Nihilism," Semen Frank endeavored to 
show that "The intelligentsia's entire attitude to politics, its fanaticism and 
intolerance, its impracticality and ineptitude in political matters, its 
obnoxious penchant for factional fighting, its warped sense of the state's 
mission -- all this flows from its monastic-religious spirit, from the fact 
that its political activities are undertaken not so much to carry out 
reforms, objectively useful in a secular sense, but to exterminate the 
enemies of faith and to convert by force the infidels into its own faith." 
[65] Mikhail Gershenson shed light on the intelligentsia's disturbing 
psychological traits underscored by a sharp contrast between the 
intelligentsia's moralism in public affairs and unscrupulousness its 
members sport in private life. "The intelligentsia's everyday life is, as a 
whole, a terrible mess," charged Gershenson; its members show "not a 
trace of discipline, no effort to be consistent even in public; days are 
wasted God knows how, as the spirit moves you, everything is topsy-
turvy; idleness, untidiness, homeric unreliability in personal affairs, naive 
lack of good faith in work, unbridled tendency toward despotism in 
politics, callous indifference to another personality; before the authorities 
-- sometimes proud challenge, sometimes meek compliance. . . ." [66] 
The Vekhi authors had their own list of exemplary Russian thinkers -- 
Pushkin, Gogol, Dostoyevsky, Fet, Tiutchev -- whom they praised lavishly 
for their nonpartisanship, humanistic beliefs, and universal, often 
religious, values -- all conspicuously absent in left-wing radicals. To head 
off the intelligentsia's dangerous proclivities, the Vekhi writers exhorted its 
members to give up its obsession with politics, look deep inside their 
hearts, and rediscover the Christian faith from which the spirit of justice 
and egalitarianism so dear to socialists had originally sprung. "For all 
those who subscribe to this idea, which in my deep conviction, has 
religious roots," concluded Struve, "it must be clear that the Russian 
intelligentsia needs a radical perestroika of its social-economic worldview. 
I think that such a perestroika is already under way" [67] 
A year after Vekhi, the Russian liberals brought out a volume summing up 
their political creed. Liberal intellectuals concurred with the Vekhi writers 
that the left radicals's militancy and partisanship were regrettable, 
particularly after the 1905-1907 upheavals and subsequent reforms 
opened up the political process, allowing Russian political parties to work 
together for socio-economic progress. But the liberals chided the Vekhi 
critics because the latter seemed to shun politics and disregard the 
historical context that exacerbated the intellectuals' mores. "[O]ne could 
not help meeting with disbelief and incredulity this call: be a human being, 
have faith, learn to love," inveighed Ivan Petrunkevich, "for the inevitable 
answer is: precisely because I treat and feel myself a human being in 
solidarity with all other human beings, I find it necessary to foster the 
[political] conditions without which human dignity will suffer; precisely 
because I love and have faith, everything that concerns my personal life 
recedes into the background." [68] 
Dmitri Ovsianiko-Kulikovsky noted with satisfaction the movement from 
the ideologically rigid ideological platforms to a more tolerant attitude 
toward the opponents. "Since the [18]80s, the call toward 
'nonpartisanship' [bezpartiinost] was heard among the intelligentsia, 
though this nonpartisanship should be understood in an ideological sense -
- as freedom from the demands of one or another ideology." He paid 
homage to Chekhov, whose stance, he insisted, did not mean the 
wholesale withdrawal from politics: "Among the people who advanced this 
slogan was Chekhov, who was immediately derided as lacking principles. 
Now we know that the freedom from powerful ideologies does not mean 
the lack of principles and is far from implying intellectual and social 
indifferentism. The type of an intelligent without a definite ideology but 
with definite principles and a thoughtfully chosen social and political 
orientation is currently becoming more and more wide-spread." [69] 
Pavel Miliukov, a historian by training and head of the Constitutional 
Democratic party, ridiculed the extremists' belief in "panaceas, messianic 
doctrines, immediate and decisive role of personal sacrifice." [70] At the 
same time, he rejected the religious critics' spurious attempts to drive a 
wedge between the rootless intelligentsia and the patriotic folk, since "the 
appearance of the intelligentsia is the necessary preliminary condition 
before a nation can acquire its own self-consciousness. Self-consciousness 
is already a product of the consciousness-raising by the intelligenty." 
[71]Miliukov pointed out that overzealous habits were forced upon the 
intelligentsia by oppressive political institutions which left few alternatives 
to the progressive forces opposed to the autocratic rule. The situation 
changed for the better, he went on, since the parliamentary organs began 
to be formed in Russia after 1905, and it would continue change in the 
future, as the Russian political process was funneled into more normal 
channels: "As its influence grows, the sectarian character of [the 
intelligentsia's] ideology would weaken, its content diversify, its goals 
become more specific, its immediate task grow more concrete, its 
business like qualities improve, and its public activity acquires continuity, 
organization, and systematicity." [72] 
The liberal pragmatism seemed at odds with the the Vekhi writers' 
revivalist tone, but the differences between the two should not be 
exaggerated. Both groups acknowledged that ideological extremism 
disfigures those who give in to it, both emphasized the civilizing effect 
that the rule of law has on society, both endorsed reforms carried out 
through legitimate political channels and urged intellectuals to cultivate 
civility as a condition for civic society. The primary target audience in each 
case was the nascent middle class, whose entrance on the political scene 
was delayed by the country's autocratic tradition. Moreover, neither 
program really implied that the Russian intelligentsia would cease to be a 
political force. Contrary to all appearances, the Vekhi authors remained 
squarely rooted in the Russian intellectual tradition -- witness their 
passion for justice, exalted view of high culture, and commitment to public 
discourse as a vehicle for social reconstruction. What they endeavored to 
do was to clean up Russian intellectual culture by ridding it of its 
ideological intolerance, emotional violence, and heroic grandstanding -- 
the points on which conservatives and liberals saw eye to eye. 
Such was the era's original contribution to Russian intellectual culture. 
This epoch started with the Slavophiles' attack on the extreme westernism 
and Dostoyevsky's critique of the intelligentsia's rootlesness, it witnessed 
Chekhov's appeal for civility and nonpartisanship, and it ended in soul-
searching by the Vekhi authors and liberal thinkers. Anton Chekhov was 
particularly instrumental in exposing the lack of civility among the 
intelligentsia, its failure to see the link between bourgeois culture and 
democratic institutions. By rejecting meshchanstvo, Russian intellectuals 
also rejected the civic virtues undergirding bourgeois democracy: the 
respect for law, private property, and the dignity of other people; the 
willingness to compromise and work through legitimate political channels; 
the cultivation of professionalism and hard work. Chekhov's ambivalent 
attitude toward the intelligentsia reflected the intelligentsia's own 
ambivalence about middle class values. Late bloomers by world historical 
standards, Russian intellectuals could see not only the glories of capitalist 
modernity but also its distempers and discontents. The intelligentsia might 
have been a modernizing force in Russian history, but it also wished to 
prolong the remnants of communitarianism hailing back to Russia 's 
premodern past. Hence, the philippics against bourgeois philistinism, 
contempt for obyvateli and meshchane, dismal work habits, and the 
bohemian unscrupulousness in personal relations. With Chekhov, Vekhi 
critics, and liberal intellectuals, Russia began to inch toward psychological 
modernity which grounds civic society in civic virtues. After all, lasting 
social change must encompass both personality and institutions, whether 
you start with oneself or with the political system. Were it not for the 
Bolshevik revolution, the liberal program of fostering a middle class 
culture and civic society in Russia might have succeeded. Alas, liberal 
critics were not able to get their message across. They remained marginal 
in the overpoliticized world of Russian cultural politics and soon yielded to 
left-wing radicalism. 
The Intelligentsia Under the Soviet Rule 
One reason the 19th century intelligentsia tried to shoulder such a heavy 
load of responsibilities was that it could not find an ally in its strenuous 
efforts to bring political modernization to Russia . While in Europe the 
intellectual strata grew largely from the bourgeoisie and more or less 
faithfully served its needs, the Russian intelligentsia had virtually no ties 
to the third estate, which did not come into its own until way into the 19th 
century. Before the intelligentsia could liberate any class, therefore, it had 
to mold it into a self-conscious political entity. If the Decembrists had any 
claim to stake concerning class representation, it had to do with the 
gentry's interests. This claim, made in a rather oblique fashion, did have 
some historical grounds: the Decembrists were committed to liberating 
their estate from autocratic excesses and consolidating the gains the 
Russian gentry made during the reign of Catherine II. For all their 
republican zeal, however, the Decembrists had no intention of dismantling 
serfdom; they were also quite content to leave the monarchy in place. 
The emancipation schemes favored by the populists were designed to 
benefit "the people" -- the toiling masses oppressed by the Tsarist regime. 
But the Russian serfs were too broad, illiterate, and dispersed a social 
entity to act as a self-conscious agent of historical change. Liberal 
intellectuals appealed primarily to the middle class, which stood to gain 
the most from the intended political reforms. The middle class was an 
increasingly assertive social stratum at the turn of the century, though its 
influence was confined chiefly to cities and provincial centers. 
Conservatives wished to preserve the present class structure or, better 
still, to go back to some more archaic social forms concocted by the 
conservative romantics' vivid imagination. 
There was also a small Social Democratic party whose followers embraced 
the Marxist doctrine, pinning their hopes on wage labor -- the proletariate. 
But their claim to "representing a class" was particularly far-fetched, given 
that industrial workers made up barely three percent of the Russian 
population at the century's turn. [73] Realizing that nurturing the Russian 
proletariat was a long term project, moderate Social Democrats -- 
theMensheviki -- tried to open up their party and turn it into a mainstream 
organization with a broad socialist appeal. The party's radical wing, 
theBolsheviki, remained committed to the communist dogma that 
envisioned the proletariat seizing power and freeing the country from the 
parasite classes exploiting wage laborers. A thankless task of raising the 
workers' class consciousness fell into the lap of educated party members. 
The latter went about their business in much the same way as their 
populist predecessors, relying primarily on propaganda and agitation, but 
also making a concerted effort to set up a party organization, train 
professional revolutionaries, and utilize clandestine publications. 
From the start, the Bolsheviks' feelings about the intelligentsia were 
drenched with ambivalence. Vladimir Lenin and his followers understood 
all too well that an educated elite had to rouse and lead the masses to the 
barricades. They also acknowledged their debt to the great tradition of 
Russia 's radical democrats. At the same time, the Bolsheviks went out of 
their way to distinguish themselves from both populist intellectuals, whose 
program they found unsuitable for the industrial age, and liberal thinkers, 
whose middle class instincts and preference for discursive means were 
unmistakably bourgeois. As Leon Trotsky (a Menshevik who later joined 
the Bolshevik faction) noted in his early piece about the intelligentsia, 
Russia lacked well organized socio-economic groups, and that compelled 
radical intellectuals to act as a "class substitute" and to invest much time 
in training progressive classes for their final assault on the autocratic 
state. "However great the intelligentsia's role might have been in the 
past," Trotsky pointed out, "it will occupy a dependent and subordinate 
place in the future." [74] Thus, the Bolsheviks declined to count 
themselves among the ranks of the mainstream intelligentsia. They saw 
their party as the vanguard of the working class and reserved no special 
political role for the intelligentsia in a future socialist society where 
intellectuals would simply become a service group distinguished by its 
education and occupational status. 
While in opposition, the Bolsheviks listed among their political demands 
basic civil liberties. They reasserted their commitment to glasnost after 
the revolution toppled the Tsarist regime in February 1917, using 
newfangled political institutions to buttress their public image as a 
radically democratic force. Sometime in the Summer of 1917 state 
institutions began to collapse, and on October 26, 1917 , the Bolsheviks 
seized power. Almost immediately, they ordered the closure of hostile 
publishing outlets, starting with the conservative press, then spread the 
ban to liberal newspapers, and eventually disallowed any publications that 
refused to bow to the Bolshevik dictate. [75] The October revolution 
(critics would call it a "putsch"), dealt a major setback to the hopes for 
democratic reform the Russian intelligentsia had nurtured for decades. 
Nothing could have done more to unite the faction-ridden Russian 
intellectuals, who were willing to tone down their differences in order to 
express their collective dismay at such a flagrant attempt to suppress 
glasnost. Zinaida Gippius was right when she claimed that the 
intelligentsia was "solidly anti-bolshevik at the time" and that "the 
exceptions were very few." [76] Virtually all nongovernment newspapers 
attacked the Bolsheviks, demanding the restoration of glasnost. The 
nation's leading intellectuals wrote personal letters to the Bolshevik 
authorities pleading with them to change their misguided course and set 
free the citizens arrested on trumped-up ideological charges 
(correspondence between the writer Vladimir Korolenko and Anatoly 
Lunacharsky, head of the Department of Education, is a fine example of 
this genre). Even some intellectuals close to Lenin felt startled by his 
reckless grab for power. Maxim Gorky, an important writer and a well-
known public figure with links to the Bolsheviks, waged a losing battle 
against the new regime on the pages of his newspaper "New Life." "Lenin, 
Trotsky and their cronies have already been poisoned by power," wrote 
Gorky on November 7, 1917 ; "witness their shameful attitude toward the 
freedom of speech, personality, and the sum total of rights for which 
democracy fought for a long time." [77] Rather than mobilizing the 
national intellectual resources, charged Gorky , the Bolsheviks declared 
war on the intelligentsia. Not only were intellectuals losing their livelihood 
and their rights -- they were also terrorized by the armed workers pitted 
against the middle classes by the unscrupulous communists. "Something 
urgent needs to be done, we have to stop the process that leaves the 
intelligentsia physically and spiritually exhausted; it is time to realize that 
it is the nation's brain and that it was never more needed than today." 
[78] 
Needless to say, Gorky 's newspaper was closed. To this tirade, Lenin 
answered with a well-known quip about those "pathetic intelligenty, the 
lackeys of capitalism who pride themselves on being the nation's brain. In 
fact, they are not the brain but shit." [79] This motto summed up the 
views on the recalcitrant intelligentsia held by the Bolsheviks during this 
period. There were concerted efforts to engage intellectuals with valuable 
technical skills (military officers, railroad engineers, doctors, etc.) in 
state's sponsored programs, but those with a liberal arts education and/or 
hostile worldview were considered to be a drag on the economy and a 
dangerous fifth column that must be neutralized before the disgruntled 
intellectuals regroup and start fomenting an opposition. After a brief 
respite that the communist government gave to the nation in the hope of 
restoring its economic health, the Bolsheviks renewed their attack on the 
intelligentsia. In the Spring of 1922, Lenin ordered massive arrests among 
the Bolsheviks' one time allies, the Mensheviks. Some were deported to 
Russia 's Far East , some sent into a permanent exile abroad. The Social 
Revolutionists met with the same fate in the Fall of 1922. The world was 
startled when in August of 1922 the Bolsheviks put the nation's leading 
philosophers on a ship (it would become known as the "philosophical 
ship") and sent them into exile in the West, with the promise to shoot 
every person who would dare to come back. [80] The newspaper Pravda 
printed an article on August 31, 1922 , to mark the occasion, bearing an 
eloquent title: "The First Warning." About the same time, Felix 
Dzerzhinsky, the feared head of the secret police, dispatched a directive to 
his deputy: "Information must be gathered by all departments and 
funnelled into the department of intelligentsia. For every intelligent there 
must be a file. . . . Also, we must keep an eye on all literature in our 
jurisdiction." [81] 
To assert strict control over brainworkers, to separate the politically 
reliable from the unreliable intellectuals, to instill communist ideology in 
the professional cadres, and to raise the new generation of the proletarian 
intelligentsia -- such were the key elements in the Communist party policy 
in regard to the intelligentsia. [82] "We need the intelligentsia cadres that 
are ideologically trained in a certain way," wrote Nikolai Bukharin, a 
leading communist intellectual at the time. "Yes, we shall 
mold intelligenty, we shall manufacture them as if on the assembly line." 
[83] Countering the charge that the Bolsheviks betrayed the 
intelligentsia's emancipatory ideals, Lunacharsky wrote that you "cannot 
expel Bolshevik- intelligenty from the intelligentsia and cross out the great 
role it played in the history of this 'order.'" [84] But he also noted 
cynically, "The more lacking in ideas the person is today, the more 
valuable he is. That is to say, if a technical specialist [spets], say, some 
engineer, has many ideas, it is worse, for these ideas distract a person 
from his work. But when he has no ideas, we could let him work right 
away. . . ." [85] The Bolsheviks were setting up a social machine where 
every cog and spindle was to serve its function, with the intellectuals 
doing its job as social technicians under the close supervision of the 
Communist party's social engineers. 
Not all intellectuals immediately rejected the Bolshevik takeover. Some 
felt that the new regime deserved a chance, that it had to act swiftly to 
fend off the reactionaries, that civil rights would be restored once the 
emergency situation eases up. As usual, Russian writers lead the way. 
Vladimir Mayakovsky, Alexander Block, Valery Briusov, Sergei Esenin, 
Nikolai Kliuev, Boris Pilniak, Isaak Babel and several other prominent 
literary figures threw their lot with the Bolsheviks. Poet Briusov became a 
censor. Mayakovsky prided himself on dedicating his muse to the 
proletarian cause. Esenin and Kliuev hailed the revolutionary whirlwind 
that stirred the hitherto inert peasant masses into political action. 
[86] Pilniak and Babel wrote novels glorifying the Soviet power's early 
years. Particularly intriguing was the case of Alexander Block, Russia 's 
premier symbolist poet. Block greeted the October revolution with an 
article titled "Can the Intelligentsia Work with the Bolsheviks?" His 
answer: "It can and it ought to [for] the intelligentsia hears the same 
music as the Bolsheviks. The intelligentsia has always been revolutionary. 
The Bolshevik decrees are the symbols of the intelligentsia. [The latter's] 
bitter feelings about the Bolsheviks are a surface phenomenon, and they 
are beginning to pass away." [87] 
Block's clumsy attempt to justify the October revolt by invoking poetic 
symbols of "chaos," "storm," and "rebellion" supposedly shared by the 
revolutionaries and creative intelligentsia provoked a fierce rebuttal from 
the old school thinkers who accused him of kowtowing to the Bolsheviks, 
thumbing his nose at the rule of law, and betraying innocent victims 
sacrificed to the revolutionary cause. Ilya Erenburg reminded Block in his 
article "The Intelligentsia and Revolution" that violent means compromise 
sound ends and that the lofty slogans deployed by the Bolsheviks could be 
just a cover-up for their ruthless drive to power. Every time I hear slogans 
like "peace" and "brotherhood," intimated Erenburg, I could not help 
wondering if "they are about to start shooting," "if I am going to be 
killed." [88] 
Block penned a few more articles on revolution and the intelligentsia and 
gathered them in a separate volume bearing the same title, but his 
enthusiasm for the new regime ebbed as the Bolsheviks stepped up the 
arrests and expulsions of intellectuals. In his last public speech, he 
suddenly changed his tune and reverted to time-honored Russian 
symbols. The occasion could not have been more portentous -- the literary 
gathering commemorating Pushkin's death. Block quoted Pushkin 
extensively, citing the famous lines from the 1836 verse where the poet 
intimates his subversive wish "for no livery/to bend my neck, my 
conscience, my beliefs." Also recited were Pushkin's paeans to "a secret 
freedom" that would take a new meaning for several generations of 
intellectuals forced to live under the Soviet rule: 
Love and a secret freedom were my beacon,  
They taught the heart its simple tune,  
To all chicanery my voice was immune,  
As people's judgment it steadfastly echoed. [89] 
Block ended his speech with a thinly veiled warning to the powers never to 
meddle with the poet's secret freedom. "Let bureaucrats face scorn if they 
wish to guide poetry into some authorized channels, if they violate its 
secret freedom and try to mess up with its mystic destiny." [90] Soon 
afterwards, Block's health took a turn to the worse. He applied for an exist 
visa to go abroad for medical treatment, but it was denied. After 
prominent Bolsheviks pleaded his case before the authorities, the 
Politburo, the Communist party's ruling organ, reversed its earlier 
decision, but it was too late. Wilting away in matters of months (doctors 
were never sure what ailed him), he died at the age of 41, a few days 
before the state finally issued him an exit visa. The prophetic words he 
voiced in his last public speech served as a poet's own epitaph: "It wasn't 
the bullet of Dantes that killed Pushkin. He died because there was no 
more air to breath." [91] 
Block's fate was not unique among the intellectuals who frowned at the 
liberal government brought to power in February of 1917 and sided with 
the Bolsheviks after they took over the reins, either out of conviction or 
just to see a steadier hand at the helm. Esenin and Mayakovsky 
committed suicide. Kliuev, Pilniak, and Babel died in Stalin's concentration 
camps along with countless communist sympathizers and fellow travellers. 
Even the Communist party intellectuals who pledged to weed out the 
bourgeois intelligentsia and replace it with proletarian seedlings 
discovered that they were not immune to the anti-intellectualist forces 
they had set in motion. Bukharin, Radek, Piatakov, Zinoviev, Kamenev, 
Rykov, Rakovsky and many others who belonged to the Bolshevik 
braintrust perished in Stalin's purges. Lunacharsky died from natural 
causes, but only because he did not live long enough to see the mass 
purges. Thanks to his expulsion from the country, Trotsky managed to 
survive longer: he was murdered on Stalin's order in Mexico , in 1940. 
The purges came in waves, decimating all classes in Soviet society, but 
the hardest hit, in relative terms, was the intelligentsia. 
Not held in high esteem by Lenin and his comrades, Joseph Stalin went to 
unimaginable lengths to settle scores with everybody who had ever had 
the misfortune to doubt his intellect and moral intelligence. In the mid-
30s, he unleashed an unprecedented campaign against the party brass, 
setting cadres with working class backgrounds against old time party 
theoreticians. [92] By far the most sensational public trial staged by 
Stalin's henchmen was directed against the so-called Rightists-Trotskytes 
Block, featuring as a star defendant Nikolai Bukharin, once designated by 
Lenin as the party's leading intellectual. As you read the ridiculous charges 
levelled against the defendants, hear the obsequious praise they heaped 
on Stalin, and recoil at the way they abased themselves hoping to save 
their own and their relatives' lives, you realize that the absence of 
glasnost is not the worst thing an intellectual could face. Although 
Bukharin found courage to deny some of the charges brought against him, 
he confessed to monstrous crimes he had never committed: 
I admit that I am guilty of treason to the Socialist fatherland, the most 
heinous of possible crimes, of the organization of kulak uprisings, of 
preparations for terrorist acts and of belonging to an underground, anti-
Soviet organization. . . . The severest sentence would be justified, 
because a man deserves to be shot ten times over for such crimes. . . . I 
am kneeling before the country, before the Party, before the whole 
people. The monstrousness of my crimes is immeasurable especially in the 
new stage of the struggle of the U.S.S.R. [93] 
This was the last public statement Bukharin would ever make. He knew 
that his life was about to end. Yet, he was praising his mortal enemy ("in 
reality the whole country stands behind Stalin; he is the hope of the 
world; he is a creator" [94] ), just because there was still a glimmer of 
hope -- not to save himself but to save his loved ones held hostage by 
Stalin. Golos, glas, glasnost -- the root morpheme is always voice, an 
ability to utter, make sense, express oneself. It is this God's gift that 
Lenin and Stalin took away from their people. Worse than that, Stalin 
made them say things they did not mean, things they found repugnant. 
The voicelessness enforced by the autocratic Tsars seemed like a bliss 
compared to the perverse glasnost of the Stalin's reign: 
People gifted with a voice faced the worst possible torture: their tongue 
was ripped out and with the bloody stump they had to praise their master. 
The desire to live was irrepressible, and it coerced people into this form of 
self-annihilation, just to extend one's physiological existence. The 
survivors turned out to be as dead as those who actually died. [95] 
These words belong to Nadezhda Mandelstam, the widow of Osip 
Mandelstam, arguably the greatest 20th century Russian poet, who 
perished in Stalin's concentration camps. Nadezhda Mandelstam's 
memoirs are among the most rivetting accounts documenting the 
intelligentsia's subterraneous existence in this macabre age. She wrote 
about the Russian intelligentsia who was brought up to revere the spoken 
word, who saw major strides made toward free expression, and whose 
members woke up one day in a different country, where the free word 
became a capital offence. While some intellectuals publicly attacked the 
revolutionary decrees curtailing glasnost, other chose to lay low in the 
hopes that the Bolshevik rule would not last. In the end, they all were 
condemned for their negative attitudes which earned the intelligentsia the 
reputation as a reactionary force in the eyes of the new authorities. And 
since the state quickly asserted its monopoly over employment, 
intellectuals had little choice but to cooperate with the regime. 
"Is there anybody among us," wrote Zinaida Gippius, another survivor 
from this era, "the most farsighted and incorruptible person imaginable, 
who is not haunted by the memories of the compromises we were forced 
to make in the St. Petersburg's captivity, who did not plead with Gorky for 
something or other or ate stale bread from the enemies palms? I know the 
taste of such bread, of this damn ration, as well as the feel of Soviet 
money in my hands. . . ." [96] The Soviet government had no intention to 
make the intellectual's ideological capitulation easy. It did not spare 
efforts to intimidate the intellectuals, to show them who was the boss, 
drumming into their heads the conditions of surrender for which they 
would be rewarded according to the sincerity of their remorse and the 
willingness to inform on their brethren still persisting in their obstinate 
ways. Most chose to compromise not out of conviction but out of 
necessity, citing the survival instinct, the need to protect children. 
"Theoretically, I know that one should not compromise, but how could I 
urge somebody to throw caution to the wind and not to compromise, to 
forget about your children. To all my friends I counsel -- compromise," 
wrote Nadezhda Mandelshtam. "There is one more thing I can add: do not 
bring children into this monstrous world." [97] 
Writers and artists found it particularly hard to silence the voice of their 
conscience. "I do not harbor hatred to anybody -- that is my 'precise 
ideology,'" wrote Mikhail Zoshchenko in 1921. [98] These words would be 
dredged up twenty five years later by Yury Zhdanov, a party hack in 
charge of Soviet art and ideology, who publicly humiliated the writer for 
his conciliatory stance and counterrevolutionary sentiments. When Yuri 
Olesha talked about the psychological difficulties that intellectuals faced 
adjusting to the new regime, he became a synonym of "gnilaia [rotten] 
intelligentsia" and subjected to endless derisions as an ideologically 
unstable element (Ilf and Petrov's fictional intelligent Vasisualy Lokhankin 
had some traits reminiscent of Olesha). "I seize my own self, reach out to 
strangle that part of myself which suddenly balks and stirs its way back to 
the old days," wrote Olesha; "I wish to stifle that second 'self,' and the 
third self, and every 'self' which come to haunt me from the past." 
[99] Vladimir Mayakovsky described his arduous labor of fitting an old self 
into the procrustean bed of Soviet ideology as "Stepping on your own 
song's throat." His own labor continued until the moment when he finally 
sent a bullet through his head. Something broke inside him, some 
wayward self escaped from the dungeon, an old song he was trying to 
strangle burst out and momentarily deafened his ideological sensibilities. 
Maxim Gorky did not have to do his penance in public, for he was too 
much revered by the Bolsheviks as the first proletarian writer, but when 
he yielded to the tempting invitations and returned to Russia from his 
exile in Italy , he found himself increasingly isolated, mistrusted, and 
ignored. Soon after his son was murdered by the NKVD, Gorky died under 
mysterious circumstances. But not before he paid his tribute to the glories 
of the Stalinist system as the founder of the "socialist realism" in literature 
and the chief "engineer of human souls." 
The Bolsheviks stopped exiling their enemies abroad in the early 20s, 
though a handful found their way to the West in the mid-20s. About the 
same time, the officially sponsored trips abroad by Soviet citizens were 
drastically curtailed (Mayakovsky committed suicide soon after he lost his 
travelling privileges when the authorities began to suspect his loyalty). 
Those who missed the last train or did not wish to taste the stale bread of 
emigration, were forced to collaborate with the regime. As time wore on, 
everyone felt the psychological pressure to reconcile one's actions loyal to 
the regime with heartfelt beliefs. Some time in the early 30s, poet Boris 
Pasternak acknowledged that the Soviet power was well entrenched, that 
the Russian people seemed to have sided with the communists, and that it 
was time for writers to accept the inevitable. [100] Osip Mandelshtam, 
who worked for various Soviet publications, called himself "a Bolshevik 
without a party card." [101] Mikhail Bulgakov assured the NKVD, a KGB 
precursor, that he considered the Soviet regime "extremely stable," that 
he "sunk strong roots in Soviet Russia," and that he could "not imagine 
himself as a writer outside" his homeland. [102] Marina Zvetaeva, who 
returned to the Soviet Union after 17 years in emigration, had to swear 
her political correctness and the loyalty of her husband arrested by the 
NKVD soon after his return ("[My husband] served his homeland and the 
communist idea with his soul and body, word and deed.") [103] Anna 
Akhmatova, whose husband, poet Nikolai Gumilev, was executed by the 
Bolsheviks and her son languished in the Gulag, had to repent in public 
after being vilified for writing apolitical, decadent verses. Mikhail 
Zoshchenko contributed to Lenin's hagiography with his stories and visited 
the infamous Baltic-White Sea channel project where political prisoners 
were used as slave laborers. Yuri Olesha penned essays about the happy 
family of Soviet people and took part in the campaign against the 
composer Dmitri Shostakovich. And these were the best and the brightest, 
individuals whose personal courage, indomitable spirit, and creative 
accomplishments would be an inspiration for generations to come. 
To be sure, the above mentioned artists and intellectuals did their 
penance under duress, trying to protect themselves and save their 
relatives' lives. Their loyalty oaths are to be taken with a bucket of salt. 
But it would be a mistake to dismiss their conversion experiences as 
nothing else but protective mimicry, strategically deployed by hunted 
intellectuals. "Mandelstam," wrote his widow, "always tried to make up his 
mind freely and check his actions against reality, but even he was not an 
entirely free person: the noise of time, the noise of life conspired to 
suppress his inner voice: 'how could I be right if everybody thinks 
otherwise'." [104] The cognitive dissonance between one's actions and 
one's beliefs, exacerbated by the enforced unanimity, goaded everyone to 
accept what then appeared to be an objective judgment of history. 
We should also resist the temptation of erecting too sharp a divide 
between the innocent intelligentsia bludgeoned into collaboration with the 
regime and the latter's faithful servants. There were many communists, 
state officials, and lowly bureaucrats who never completely surrendered 
their "secret freedom" and felt perturbed by Stalin's atrocities. We find 
numerous, often grudging, references in the memoirs from this era that 
hint at a helping hand that this or that Soviet officials offered beleaguered 
intellectuals in times of trouble. It could be none other than Anatoly 
Lunacharsky, head of the Enlightenment Ministry supervising the 
communist education and propaganda, who bombarded the Politburo with 
letters demanding an exit visa for Block and helped dozens of intellectuals 
to leave Russia when its was still possible. Or it could be a lowly Soviet 
clerk arranging a ration card for a hungry writer and declining to report 
his angry mutterings to the secret police. "These were people who did 
quite well "up there" but who did not forget their old friends. Some of 'us' 
are still alive thanks to their efforts." [105 
Sorting out victims and predators inhabiting the Soviet zoo is not an easy 
task. "As very many people, and especially intelligenty, and especially 
artists, and especially writers, Yuri Olesha was this era's victim and its 
gardener, its prisoner and its mason." [106] Whether they were on good 
terms with the regime or languished on its margins, intellectuals lead a 
double or triple existence, thinking one thing to themselves, sounding 
another within an earshot of family and friends, and saying and doing 
something else in public. This multi-layered existence left a profound mark 
on the Soviet intellectual's psyche. He could pride himself on his "secret 
freedom," but he also knew that he was compromising with his 
conscience. The pattern familiar to us from the time of Pushkin and 
Chaadaev blossomed in the Soviet Union where doublespeak and 
doublethink were perfected into an art form. Just consider Mandelstam's 
1934 verse bitterly renouncing Stalin and his 1937 poem where he sings 
praise to the tyrant. Bulgakov's novel "Master and Margarita" satirized 
Soviet society, but the same author wrote a play "Batum" extolling Stalin's 
virtues. Pasternak's "Doctor Zhivago" could not erase his verses about the 
nation builder, Joseph Stalin. Anna Akhmatova, a proud spirit steadfastly 
squelching every temptation to collaborate with the regime, wrote a poem 
glorifying Soviet Russia's spectacular accomplishments. Most of these 
writings are unexemplary and better left unread (though Mandelshtam's 
1937 Ode to Stalin is a work of rare poetic power!). [107] Some of them 
were written under duress (Akhmatova hoped to buy with her verses 
amnesty for her son). But all the writings testified to the torturous 
existence lead by the Soviet intellectual burdened with conscience and 
memory. 
Even in this eerie age there were certain standards of morality accepted 
within the intelligentsia circles. When Stalin called Pasternak and 
questioned him about Mandelshtam who was recently arrested by the 
NKVD for his anti-Stalinist verse ("Why didn't you plead for your friend?," 
Stalin asked Pasternak. "If my poet friend were in trouble, I would have 
climbed the wall to save him"), [108] Pasternak answered that he did 
complain about Mandelstam's arrest and that his friend should be 
released. No, he did not confront the tyrant; he did not tell him what a 
disgrace to humanity he was or put him on notice that there was a special 
place reserved for him in Dante's ninth circle of hell. But Anna Akhmatova 
and Nadezhda Mandelshtam were exactly right when they concluded in 
their post mortem to this conversation that, under the circumstances, 
Pasternak's behavior "merits a solid 'B' grade." Agonizing about one's 
actions in morally charged situations, evaluating and reevaluating an 
individual's conduct under trying circumstances, would become a sad 
pastime for Soviet intellectuals. 
Saltykov-Shchedrin, the famous 19th century satirist, formulated a 
classical question facing Russian intelligentsia -- What is to be done when 
there is nothing you can do? As Soviet experience showed, there were 
things intellectuals could do to salvage their battered conscience. This is 
the advice Arkady Belinkov had to offer in his book about Yuri Olesha, a 
brilliant study indispensable for understanding the psychology of Soviet 
intelligentsia: "The worst thing that an intellectual could do [while working 
for the system], is to strive to do his base duty with distinction, better 
than others, to become the first student." [109] In other words, one had 
to do as little damage to others as possible, take only such onerous 
assignment that could not be evaded, and do private penance among 
friends for one's less than commendable deeds. Mikhail Svetlov joked: An 
honest person is the one who never does anything dishonest, except when 
he is forced to, and who is disgusted with himself every time he does a 
dishonest thing. 
Irony, sarcasm, black humor, anecdotes parodying official symbols would 
become an indispensable weapon in the arsenal of the Soviet intelligentsia 
struggling with inane Soviet realities. We can see them as a socio- 
psychological hygiene practiced by people seeking to protect their faces 
underneath the repugnant masks they wore in public. Irony is a clue, to 
himself as well as to others, that what seems to be going on is only a 
front not to be confused with a private self hidden beneath the official 
uniform. Ironic detachment is worn like a merit badge (or a stigma 
depending on how you look at it) that the individual uses to highlight his 
difference, to let an alternative spiritual reality peak through the debased 
ideological discourse. We have seen how this behavioral gambit was used 
by 19th century intellectuals to a rather mixed effect. The same technique 
would be used, though more as a prophylactic or survival strategy, by the 
Soviet intelligentsia. 
Nadezhda Mandelshtam remembers the encounters she had in the early 
20s with Ilya Erenburg when "he looked on everything as if he were a 
stranger . . . and hid himself behind ironic omniscience. He already figured 
out that irony was the weapon of the helpless." [110] We can find brilliant 
examples of irony and satire in Shklovsky's book "The Zoo," in Mikhail 
Bulgakov novel "Master and Margarita," in Mandelshtam's "The Forth 
Prose." Or in this passage from Arkady Belinkov in which he lampoons the 
Soviet reluctance to admit that there might be problems in this most 
perfect of the possible worlds: 
Even in our days, though extremely rarely and only in extraordinary 
situations sometimes arise minor contradictions between bad artists and 
wonderful society. To be sure, they are resolved expeditiously, but to 
ignore them altogether would be a touch premature. Those minor and 
instantly resolvable contradictions usually arise in connection with the 
slight incongruity between socialist realism and realistic socialism. [111] 
Such overextended official rhetorics and symbols would be immediately 
recognized by any Soviet intellectual as an irreverent gesture toward 
official Soviet ideology. But an experienced censor would also have no 
trouble smelling a ruse, which is why none of the just mentioned books 
could be published in Stalin's Russia . Written in secret and kept away 
from outsiders, sometimes even from family and friends, such works 
should be seen as surviving monuments to "secret freedom," Pushkin's 
and now the Soviet intellectual's last solace. As for irony, this ultimate 
weapon of the spiritual proletariat, it was directed mostly at the relatives, 
colleagues, and friends who bore the brunt of bitterness and alienation 
that the creative spirits suffered in the land of perverted glasnost. 
Memoirs from this period tell us about the price intellectuals paid for their 
survival, about their collective "traumatic psychosis," as Nadezhda 
Mandelstam called the phenomenon, though we are already familiar with 
it under the name "terrible ulcer" that Chaadaev gave to it back in the 
19th century. Subsumed under these terms are abnormalities encysted in 
a psyche that suffered intellectual abuse first hand or witnessed the 
ideological bloodbath from afar. A silent witness, points out Igor Kon, a 
sociologist who survived Stalinism, was worse off in some ways, 
particularly if he was young. [112] Helplessness and terror experienced by 
the children whose parents were declared to be "enemies of the people" 
induced a trauma they would not be able to shake for life. This grim 
legacy of political purges will remain with the Russian intelligentsia for 
some time to come. 
The Stalinist era made few original contributions to Russian intellectual 
culture that were not already in place during the Tsars. Perverted glasnost 
was one, fear of taking an unpopular stance and going against the 
majority was another, plus a compulsive jocularity that masked the 
victim's pain. On the whole, the Stalinist only era exacerbated certain trait 
in Russian intellectuals culture. It gave them a grotesque, offensive form 
which left permanent scars on human beings thrust into the vortex of 
Russian history and forced to wade through hostile intellectual currents. 
Its legacy was apparent in the ever-widening gap between word and deed, 
in the perverted glasnost imposed on the population by the NKVD 
inquisitors, in the spiritual withdrawal by intellectuals labelled "inner 
emigration," in the off-putting interpersonal style aimed at debunking 
official realities through exaggerated irony and sarcasm, and the resultant 
pattern of self-loathing revealed by intellectuals alienated from society, 
from each other, and from their public selves. The Stalinist social 
technologies stifled personal voice, drove private feelings inside, installed 
false-consciousness in place of freely chosen convictions, and replaced the 
curative powers of dialogue with the numbing force of propaganda. It 
would take decades for Russian intellectual culture to free itself from the 
Stalinist legacy. This process is far from being complete; in fact, it has 
barely begun; but it is going on, thanks to the ideological thaw that Russia 
experienced after Stalin's death. 
The Intelligentsia and the Thaw 
The first step toward sheering Russian intellectual discourse of its Stalinist 
diction was made not by an intellectual but by the uncouth, boorish Nikita 
Khrushchev, Stalin's protege and the survivor in the on-going Kremlin's 
struggle for power. The intelligentsia did not have a monopoly on suffering 
in Stalin's Russia . All social strata were equally affected, including the 
privileged party nomenklatura. Khrushchev had his reasons to hate Stalin; 
he never forgot how "the greatest leader of all time" humiliated him by 
ordering this poorly coordinated man to dance Ukrainian folk dances 
before his laughing comrades, though that was a trifle compared to what 
Stalin did to his flunkies. More to the point, the political purges that 
affected many of Khrushchev's friends were about to consume him as 
well. Whether or not Stalin was poisoned by his comrades fearing for their 
lives, as some researchers suspect, is debatable; there could be no doubt 
that toward the end of his life, Stalin was a menace to every sane person 
in the land. 
In 1956, Khrushchev gave a speech at the 20th Party Congress in which 
he denounced Stalin and his terrorist tactics. The speech was secret, the 
speaker was mainly preoccupied with the plight of innocent communists 
devoured by the Gulag, but its effect was felt by the entire country. In 
1961, at the 22d Party Congress, Khrushchev reaffirmed his commitment 
to the rule of law, democratic procedures within the party, greater 
freedom for artists, and improving welfare of the population as a whole. 
"Society [that] shoved the flute down the artist's throat," [113] seemed 
ready to recoil from past horrors and grant its members greater leeway. 
Khrushchev might not have realized what he set in motion, but the seeds 
of glasnost he planted survived his reign, sprouted in underground 
intellectual bunkers, and in time, sapped the communist regime's vitality 
to a point when it was ready to collapse. 
"It is amazing how I survived through those harrowing years," wrote Boris 
Pasternak soon after Stalin's death. "It is simply unbelievable what I 
allowed myself back then. But then my fate shaped me exactly the way I 
shaped my fate. I foresaw a lot and, what is most important, I could not 
accept a lot of things . . . I did not store enough patience [for the ordeal]. 
. . . My time is still far away." [114] Pasternak was right: his time would 
come nearly thirty years after his death. Meanwhile, he had to face the 
expulsion from the Soviet Writers' Union, renounce his Nobel Price 
awarded to him for his novel "Doctor Zhivago," endure heart attacks 
precipitated by his daring decision to make his lonely voice heard. Still, 
the portentous fact was that Pasternak found courage not only to write a 
novel defying the socialist realism's cannons but also to publish it abroad -
- something that could not have happened without Khrushchev's thaw. 
The vials of tears shed by those lucky enough to survive Stalin's regime 
nourished the new intellectual currents and helped reestablish the link 
between the old and the new intelligentsia. 
Ever since the Bolshevik takeover, a debate was raging inside and outside 
Russia as to whether the old Russian intelligentsia was dead and whether 
it could be brought back to life. According to Georgy Fedotov, one of the 
most perceptive historians to study the subject, "The intelligentsia that 
was decimated by the revolution has lost its meaning and could not be 
resuscitated." [115] Other writers disagreed, arguing that the old Russian 
intelligentsia might be dead but the new one, bearing a strong family 
resemblance to the prototype, will no doubt emerge. Fedotov himself was 
ambivalent in this regard; at the end of his career he called for a new 
"intellectual elite" that could rejuvenate Russia. [116] I leave aside the 
question of whether the intellectuals who called themselves intelligenty in 
post-Stalin Russia are related to the old intelligentsia. What is important is 
that these intellectuals took pride in calling themselves by this word 
commonly used as a term of derision in Stalin's time, that they were 
eager to trace their lineage to their illustrious predecessors and continue 
their emancipatory work. I cannot do any justice here to the diverse 
intellectual currents that sprung to life in this heady era, but I will try, 
using a wide brush, to paint the major ideological divides along which 
intellectuals arranged themselves during Khrushchev's thaw and beyond. 
There were a great many intellectuals awakened by the de-Stalinization 
campaign who realized that the Soviet regime was an aberration. What 
they could not agree upon was whether socialism was the culprit or just 
its Stalinist incarnation. Most liberal intellectuals who chose to collaborate 
with the regime tried to humanize it through painstaking education 
designed to expose Stalinist excesses and turn the country toward 
democratic socialism. Andrey Sakharov, Russia's leading dissident, spoke 
in his path-breaking book that set him on the collision course with the 
authorities about "the moral attractiveness of the ideas of socialism and 
the glorification of labor, compared with the egotistical ideas of private 
ownership and the glorification of capital," leaving no doubt where his own 
heart was. [117] Vladimir Lakshin, a widely read Soviet critic, described in 
very similar terms the ideals that animated him and his colleagues at 
Novy Mir, a premier literary magazine in post-Stalin Russia : "But we 
believed in socialism as a noble ideal of justice, we believed in a socialism 
that was human through and through and not just with a human face. We 
regarded the democratic rights of the individual as incontestable." [118] 
The key element in the program advanced by Sakharov and his liberal 
followers was glasnost and intellectual freedom, i.e., the need to bring to 
the open forum all political issues and the right to voice one's opinion 
regarding any policy matter. From the start, the intelligentsia set out to 
work within the legal bounds, since Khrushchev's reforms contained an 
implicit promise that one could criticize past mistakes and offer fresh ideas 
for the future. "The Democratic movement," asserted Andrey Amalrik, 
"intends to operate under the rule of law and glasnost and to work for 
glasnost, which distinguishes it from small and big underground groups." 
[119] " Glasnost, honest and unabridged glasnost," insisted Solzhenitsyn, 
"such is the first condition of every healthy society, including ours. 
Whosoever does not want glasnost for our society -- is indifferent to his 
homeland and thinks only about himself. Those who do not wish glasnost 
in our society do not want to cure its ills but to drive them deeper inside 
where they could fester." [120] 
In 1962, Novy Mir published Solzhenitsyn's powerful novel "One Day in 
the Life of Ivan Denisovitch" in which the author, drawing on his own 
experience in the Gulag, wrote about a political prisoner's daily routine. 
Khrushchev personally approved the publication and rumors swirled about 
the Lenin Prize waiting for the author. But the prize went to somebody 
else, Khrushchev was deposed, and Leonid Brezhnev's conservative 
regime came to power, dashing hopes for further liberalization. This is 
when the ideological scales began to fall off from the intelligentsia's eyes 
and the Democratic movement went underground. At this very point, a rift 
had surfaced within the ranks of the intelligentsia, one that is still 
apparent today, which separated intellectuals who chose to continue 
working for liberalization through official channels and those who gave up 
on reforming the system from within. 
Among those who took the second route were Andrey Amalrik, Valery 
Chalidze, Alexander Volpin, Petr Grigorenko, Vladimir Bukovsky, Vladimir 
Maximov, Natalia Gorbanevskaia, Viktor Nekrasov, and a few dozen other 
activists. Their program centered around human rights and the need to 
hold the Soviet government accountable for its deeds. The idea, that is 
sometimes attributed to Alexander Volpin, seemed simple and 
unimpeachable: the government must respect its own laws, as well as the 
international covenants it has signed. The point was to spotlight the cases 
where the state validated legal procedures and to bring the weight of 
public opinion to bear on the culprits: "We do not have to obey anything 
but the law. We must defend our laws from the abuse by the authorities. 
We are on the side of the law. They are against it." [121] Demonstrations 
ensued; signed petitions went to the top; courts where political dissidents 
went on trial were picketed by the Democratic movement activists who 
demanded glasnost in court rooms guaranteed by the Soviet law. As a 
result, public attention was drawn to the fact that local Soviet authorities 
routinely used extra-legal means against independent trade union 
activists, harassed religious worshipers, curtailed political prisoners' rights, 
violated the UN resolutions guaranteeing freedom of speech, political 
gatherings, and emigration. The world was not amused to learn that UN 
Human Rights Charter signed by the Soviet Union was not released to its 
citizens. 
Compelling as the idea behind it was, the Democratic movement petered 
out after several years of fruitful work that exposed to the world 
numerous abuses by the Soviet authorities. The movement's activists 
vastly underestimated the government's resolve to stamp out political 
dissent, the ruthlessness with which the KGB would clamp down on the 
intelligentsia. Soon after Nikita Khrushchev was deposed, the new regime 
put the liberals on notice that it would not tolerate open dissent. The 
future's chilling auguries came through loud and clear in early 1966 when 
the authorities staged the first political show trial in the post-Stalinist era, 
sending to prison Andrey Siniavsky and Yuli Daniel for publishing their 
works in the West without state approval. More trials followed. Some 
activists from the Democratic movement were imprisoned, others sent 
into internal exile, still others forced to emigrate. 
Along side the Democratic movement, other intellectual currents were 
gathering momentum that advocated ethnic minorities' rights, religious 
freedom, artistic freedom, the freedom of emigration, and so on. Of 
particular note among these groups was the movement initiated by 
Alexander Solzhenitsyn and his close friend Igor Shefarevich. Both writers 
sought to revive the nationalist themes that lay fallow since the 
Slavophiles introduced them into public discourse, giving a special 
emphasis to "the traditional ancient Russian notion of pravda [truth] as an 
expression of justice that is superior to any formal law." 
[122] Solzhenitsyn took issue with Sakharov's notion that intellectual 
freedom and human rights were key to social reconstruction in Russia: 
Look farther ahead, look at the West. Surely, the West is awash in all 
sorts of freedoms, including intellectual freedom. Did it save it? Today we 
can see the West: its will paralyzed, sinking fast, oblivious of the future, 
its soul neurotic and enfeebled. In and of itself, intellectual freedom can 
not save us. . . . The absolutely necessary task [facing us] cannot be 
reduced to the political liberation, but to the liberation of our souls from 
the participation in the lies imposed on us. . . [123] 
Borrowing from the Vekhi platform, Solzhenitsyn decried the Democratic 
movement's preoccupation with politics and scolded Russian intellectuals 
for neglecting their national roots. The Russian intelligentsia would have to 
reinvent itself, he insisted; it has to be reconstituted around "a morally 
intelligent core [intelligentnoe iadro]" that is distinguished not by its 
members' "scientific degrees, the number of publications, years of 
schooling . . . but by the purity of their strivings, by the willingness to 
make a spiritual sacrifice -- for truth and most of all -- for this country 
where one lives." [124] Solzhenitsyn called the Russians to "national 
repentance" and urged his fellow citizens not to cooperate with the regime 
or, to use his memorable line, "not to live by lie." 
One more important intellectual spring broke through the infertile Soviet 
ground in the post-Stalinist era. It was championed by the creative 
intelligentsia, mostly writers, like Andrey Siniavsky, Yuly Daniel, and 
Joseph Brodsky, who were fed up with politics, shunned official society, 
and pursued free aesthetic expression. Those who shared this creed had 
as exalted a view of the artist's place in society as did their 19th century 
radical predecessors, but they did not want to see art and literature as 
playgrounds for conflicting ideologies. Whatever literature had to teach 
society should not be done through moralizing and didacticism. Here is 
how Joseph Brodsky framed the idea: 
Books became the first and only reality, whereas reality itself was 
regarded as either nonsense or nuisance. Compared to others, we were 
ostensibly flunking or faking our lives. But come to think of it, existence 
which ignores the standards professed in literature is inferior and 
unworthy of effect. So we thought, and I think we were right. [125] 
"The intuitive preference was to read rather than to act," Brodsky went 
on, "No wonder our lives were more or less in shambles." But with certain 
qualifications, the same could have been said about any person striving to 
be morally intelligent under the increasingly oppressive conditions in 
Russia. By the mid-70s, the Soviet government opened up a frontal attack 
on dissent of all stripes, confronting the Russian intelligentsia with the 
familiar conundrum -- what is to be done when there is nothing you can 
do. Decent choices were few: to withdraw from society and become an 
internal emigre, to go underground and keep exposing Soviet power 
abuses, to work through legal channels, doing what one possibly could to 
educate society, especially the new generation. Dissident intellectuals who 
tried to keep the government's feet to the fire by exposing the KGB 
abuses in the West resented their liberal colleagues still working for the 
state. The smoldering debate about the morality of collaboration with the 
communist government bent on preserving its power at any cost revealed 
the deepening rift between radical and liberal intellectuals. The defiant 
Solzhenitsyn broke with his liberal colleagues at Novy Mir over its cautious 
editorial policies and challenged every Russian citizen to "fortify oneself 
and refuse to budge, sacrificing one's life rather than the principle!" 
[126] Solzhenitsyn set an example himself by publishing his works abroad 
and openly meeting with Western reporters. As Boris Pasternak before 
him, Solzhenitsyn was expelled from the Writers' Union , but unlike his 
predecessor, Solzhenitsyn was deported from Russia , after which he lived 
as a political exile in the US . The same fate befell Arkady Belinkov who, 
having reached the safety of exile, launched a scathing attack on his 
liberal colleagues: 
[I]n the concrete history of the 1960s, K. Fedin is worse than N. 
Gribachev, P. Antokolsky is more dangerous than V. Kochetov, E. 
Evtushenko is more repugnant than A. Markov, B. Slutsky is uglier than V. 
Firsov, P. Nilin is more base than I. Shevtsov, I. Selvinsky is more sinister 
than A. Sofronov, V. Shklovsky is more distasteful than V. Ermilov 
because all these carbonari, Jacobins, freedom fighters, breaknecks do to 
[free] public thought what ultramasons, Vendeans, cossacks, and black 
hundreds did, except that the former crowd does its thing with panache 
and flare, with a sense of poetry, harmony, and charm. . . . [127] 
Understandably, the loyal liberals who came into their own in the 60s 
(they are still commonly referred to in the intelligentsia parlance 
asshestidesiatniki -- the generation of the 60s) had a very different idea 
about their mission in society. Efim Etkind, a scholar and a literary critic, 
confronted head-on the dilemma that Solzhenitsyn presented to his 
countrymen, "Aren't the absolute refusal to compromise and the 
unconditional determination to pursue truth and defend human rights 
always preferable to the willingness to play politics, make compromises, 
and show moral flexibility?" [128] Etkind's answer: Solzhenitsyn fell victim 
to "moral maximalism" especially dangerous in the current political 
climate. No dissident acts in a vacuum; his choices affect other people 
who might suffer gravely after the individual decides to take a heroic ego 
trip. [129] Solzhenitsyn, Etkind charged, vastly overestimated the public's 
interest in challenging the powers and seriously underestimated the fact 
that "the enlightenment must precede [political] renaissance, [that] 
underground publications are not sufficient. . . . The first task is to teach, 
educate, enlighten. To participate in this centrally important -- indeed the 
only relevant activity in our time, we should be ready to conceal thoughts, 
yield and maneuver, of course within the morally acceptable limits." 
[130] Lakshin's rebuttal to Solzhenitsyn was even more forceful. Lakshin 
charged that the imminent author snubbed his colleagues at Novyi Mir, 
that his "indifference to means, the psychology of the preventive strike, 
cruelty and lying" reflected his prison camp experience, that "Solzhenitsyn 
also imbibed the poison of Stalinism," that "the author who addresses us 
with his passionate appeal for us to pursue truth, humanity, and goodness 
scorns to observe these commandments in his own dealings." 
[131] Meanwhile, the liberals in good standing with the government had 
to voice their approval when the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia 
(Novyi Mir publicly endorsed the invasion), look the other way when 
Sakharov was forced into exile, keep their outrage to themselves when 
the state placed dissidents into psychiatric wards, curse the Communist 
party's harebrained economic schemes in the relative privacy of their 
home, and rely chiefly on the time-honored "secret freedom" (which was 
renamed at the time into "inner freedom") to keep their sanity intact. 
Such was the "moral torture," as Etkind put it, that the intelligentsia 
suffered after Khrushchev's demise. Soviet intellectuals coping with the 
adversity in the pot-Stalinist era reminded one of Spanish Jews forced to 
choose between their own traditional faith and official conversion, with 
either option entailing a prohibitive cost. Thinking one thing, saying 
another, and doing something altogether different, intellectual marronos 
populating Soviet society could not help but lose track of their private and 
official identities. The recourse to irony seemed natural. "In the 
atmosphere of mendacity," remembers a veteran of those years, "all-
consuming irony becomes a universal self-defense mechanism." [132] But 
in the end, irony and self-parodying did not so much keep apart official 
and unofficial selves as helped the individual cover up the snarled web of 
his motivation. The burden of affliction from which intellectuals suffered in 
post-Stalin's Russia might have been somewhat lighter than the "terrible 
ulcer" that sent Chaadaev into depression, and it was probably less 
clinically disturbing than the "traumatic psychosis" that disfigured 
Nadezhda Mandelstam's generation. Still, it did a lot of damage to the 
intellectuals' selfhood, sapped their creative energies, and played havoc 
with their private lives. 
If the Russian intelligentsia learned anything in the post-Soviet period, it 
is to mistrust left radicalism that shaped the 19th century intelligentsia. 
The break had not come easily or swiftly. "You see," remembers one 
veteran of the era, "for all our irreverent dissidence (inakomyslie), our 
hearts responded with emotions to the old [communist] symbols, images, 
and commandments which -- miraculously and in spite of everything -- 
retained for us the purity of that original flame." [133] Even seasoned 
fighters and internal emigres with no illusions about the regime resorted 
to the communist lingo to explained their ways, as did Brodsky during his 
1963 trial when the prosecutor pressed him to demonstrate how his life 
style jibed with the Soviet people's efforts to build a communist society: 
"Building communism is not just operating the machine and plowing the 
earth. It is also the work of the intelligentsia which. . ." -- that is as far as 
the judge permitted the future Nobel laureate to take his argument. 
[134] But by the mid- 70s, when the Brezhnev regime entered the 
stagnation years and open dissident voices were brutally silenced, the 
liberal intelligentsia began to slip off its socialist moorings. The 
preoccupation with moral intelligence inched its way back into existence. 
[135] Soviet intellectuals sought moral fortitude in the works of Pushkin 
and Chekhov, placing on their agenda "the acquisition of a 'secret 
freedom,' the acquisition through one's own intellectual and moral effort." 
[136] Camus's "Myth of Sisyphus" captured the intelligentsia's imagination 
as emblematic of its hopeless existence amidst official hypocrisy and 
corruption. [137] With the increased repressions came thoughts about 
emigration (an option that virtually disappeared in the late 70s) and the 
longing for the West and faraway cultures. "It was not just political 
anecdotes and irreverent songs that sustained us in those years, it was 
not just the irony which became the signature trait of our spiritual 
makeup, it was also the longing for Paris which we had no chance to see -
- ever." As before, intellectuals turned their bitterness and anger against 
themselves and their loved ones. Moral compromises, forced 
voicelessness, the fear of cracking under the KGB pressures -- all these 
features explain the ambivalence that post-Stalinist Russia and the 
intelligentsia it engendered continue to elicit in intellectuals who lived 
through this muddled era. 
As for the Russian intellectual culture, it did undergo some changes during 
this period. Khrushchev's thaw left an indelible mark on the new 
generation of Soviet intellectuals evident in their skepticism about socialist 
ideologies, the renewed belief in glasnost as a condition for social 
reconstruction, a willingness to take a public stance, the narrowing of the 
gap between word and deed. But other features ingrained in the 
intelligentsia's collective consciousness -- vanguardism, moral 
maximalism, ironic detachment, contempt for meshchanstvo, belief in the 
literature's transformative role -- remained largely unaffected. If anything, 
violent emotions, self-loathing, and standoffish demeanor were 
exacerbated by the situation where one was presented with a clear choice, 
albeit an unpalatable one, between the repression awaiting those who 
dared to stand up to the powers and closet liberalism that relegated the 
morally intelligent person to a moral torture chamber. Lakshin had a point 
when he charged his esteemed colleague, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, in 
reproducing totalitarian stratagems in his own conduct. But did liberal 
intellectuals free themselves from this syndrome? The test came as 
Mikhail Gorbachev opened up a new and final chapter in Soviet history. 
Perestroika and Beyond 
Neither "glasnost" nor "perestroika," as we saw earlier, are recent 
inventions. Both terms have a long pedigree in Russian intellectual 
history. Count Petr Viazemsky, a friend of Pushkin, hailed glasnost and 
decried its absence in Russia as early as 1831. [138] Following him, 
Herzen, Dobroliubov, Chernyshevsky, Ivanov-Razumnik, Miliukov and 
other Russian intellectuals identified the right to voice one's opinion on the 
full range of public issues as indispensable for a healthy society. The same 
goes for "perestroika" which was invoked by Russian politically-conscious 
intellectuals to highlight the importance of making a radical break with 
past beliefs and practices and setting the country on a path toward 
political modernization. What made Mikhail Gorbachev's usage different 
was that he invoked both terms simultaneously and employed them to 
advance a liberal rather than radical political agenda. 
The Soviet leader came to power in April of 1985. Within a year he was 
talking about the need for glasnost in politics and perestroika in the 
economy, but ideological blinkers were still on tight. Few people inside or 
outside the Communist party took Gorbachev's musings seriously -- they 
saw too many government-instigated campaigns peter out in the past. 
Skeptics notwithstanding, the new rhetoric took wing, generating 
unprecedented changes in Soviet domestic and foreign policy. That 
perestroika had plenty of substance could no longer be denied once 
political prisoners were set free, censorship eased up, political dissent 
tolerated, emigration allowed, and disarmament talks pushed beyond all 
expectations. The first signs that the intellectuals were taking Gorbachev 
seriously came about a year and half into his tenure, as some journalists 
tested the limits of glasnost by bringing up topics previously excluded 
from public debate. Alexander Vasinsky wrote the pioneering article 
bearing the title "The Ballad of the Difference of Opinion" where he urged 
that all opinions, including the ones we passionately oppose, be given the 
benefit of the doubt. To add extra weight to his argument Vasinsky dug up 
a rare quotation from Lenin in which the founder of the Soviet state 
chastised those who "spread hatred, intolerance, contempt, etc., toward 
dissenters [nesoglasnomysliashchie]." [139] Following Vasinsky, other 
intellectuals picked up kindred themes with fewer and fewer references to 
the communist luminaries. "One of the conditions of honesty and 
directness that our time demands," asserted Sergei Averintsev, a leading 
Russian philologist, "is putting an end to the situation where we confuse 
the dissenter (nesoglasnyi) with the enemy. The intelligentsia must 
nurture in itself the culture of dissent (kultura nesoglasiia), the culture of 
debate. I am talking not just about weak tolerance but true respect for the 
opponent." [140] "We still do not have enough courage to say 'the king is 
naked,'" charged Vladimir Dudintsev in an article denouncing past abuses 
in Soviet science. "And this is in spite of the democratic foundations of our 
society which requires glasnost, and therefore the freedom to defend 
one's views. The final judge in any dispute should be the argument, yet it 
is power and connections, I am sad to say, which often decide the 
matter." [141] 
By 1988, the communist hierarchs realized that Gorbachev's changes had 
gone too far and started pressuring him to slow down reforms. 
Immediately, the intelligentsia swung into action, claiming an equal 
partnership in the reform process. Khrushchev's failure to carry out his 
reform, intellectuals maintained, had much to do with his turning his back 
on the intelligentsia and neglecting to tap the intellectual resources that 
proved indispensable in his earlier struggle with the party hierarchy. The 
man who started the political thaw after Stalin's death "paid dearly for his 
mistrust and contempt for the intelligentsia," [142] charged Fedor 
Burlatsky, a former Khrushchev's aid, in a statement echoed by 
many shestidesiatniki. This was a thinly veiled warning to the new 
administration to engage the intelligentsia, to make it a full partner in 
Gorbachev's reforms. Poet Andrey Voznesensky predicated the success of 
social reconstruction on the nation's ability to mobilize its intellectual 
resources, to deploy culture and moral intelligence -- two areas in which 
Russian intellectuals traditionally claimed a special expertise: 
A spiritual revolution is stirring in our land, a life and death struggle for a 
new thinking against the still powerful inertia of the past. This is not a 
cultural revolution, but a revolution by Culture. . . . Born again is the old 
Russian word glasnost, the word that makes active repentance a norm 
and that goes back to Tolstoy whose ideal of fighting evil with active 
conscience has such resonance today. [143] 
Perestroika reignited the old debate about the intelligentsia, its place in 
the reform process, the linkage between the old and the new 
intelligentsia, and the troubled relationship between the intelligentsia, the 
people, and the state. For the first time, the intelligentsia had a chance to 
settle old accounts, regale its survival stories, expose the enemies of 
nonconformist intellectuals. Many established scholars, writers, and artists 
expressed remorse, or were called upon to repent by their colleagues, for 
their past actions or inactions. Relishing their newly found freedom and 
capitalizing on their access to secret archives, intellectuals delved into 
areas once excluded from public discussion: the famines, economic 
failures, environmental disasters, forced collectivization, mass purges, the 
Gulag culture, persecution of religious and ethnic minorities. . . . 
As soon as the first rays of glasnost shined through ideological 
obfuscations, the intelligentsia set out to reassert its world-historical 
calling and reclaim responsibility for the future. Intellectuals searched 
their illustrious pedigree, sought to own up to their past mistakes, and 
drew heavily on the Vekhi critique which exposed the Russian 
intelligentsia's unsavory practices. Following Chekhov, intellectuals hailed 
moral intelligence [intelligentnost] as a defining characteristic for anyone 
claiming membership among the intelligentsia's ranks. A highly respected 
Russian scholar, Dmitri Likhachev, told an interviewer that "an unschooled 
peasant can be called an intelligent, but the same cannot be said about a 
ruffian, even if he is burdened with intellect, scientific degrees, and official 
honors. . . . For 'Russian intelligent' designates a soulful, moral, rather 
than cerebral, category. Better put: unless movement of the heart 
precedes movement of thought, a person cannot be called an intelligent." 
[144] This wording suggests a shift in focus away from the intelligentsia 
as a corporate group that marked the official Soviet perspective and 
toward intelligentnost or moral intelligence as a personal disposition and a 
pattern of conduct displayed in a particular situation. This theme looms 
large in a posthumously published note [145] by A. F. Losev, a celebrated 
Russian philosopher, a survivor of numerous campaigns against the 
intelligentsia. Losev's article is titled " Ob intelligentnosti ," which could be 
freely rendered tus: "On Feeling, Thinking, and Acting as an Intelligent." 
In this remarkable piece, the author talks about moral intelligence as a 
total way of life and a peculiarly Russian ideology which "appears out of 
nowhere, all by itself; it acts without understanding its own action; it 
pursues as its end the well-being of humanity, and it does so without 
having any clear idea of its actions. The true ideology of true moral 
intelligence is naive." The intelligent, goes on Losev, could not be socially 
indifferent; he is acutely aware of the world's inanities and is determined 
to "transform reality" -- he is a "person who takes the interest of 
humanity as his own." Moral intelligence is "conscious spiritual labor to 
improve oneself and to make the world around us rational." The 
true intelligent is no utopian dreamer; he can critically assess reality, he 
knows when to act, when to lay low, where and how to pick up a fight. In 
time, moral intelligence becomes self-reflexive and more assertive. The 
labor of moral intelligence is the work of reason in history carried out by a 
particular individual who fights the day's brush fires with his sight trained 
on his destiny, which is to be a civilizing force in history. The life of moral 
intelligence is subject to all the vagaries of everyday life, it is tragic, 
heroic, and beautiful at the same time. 
These ruminations about the intelligentsia's mission in society fall squarely 
within the Russian intellectual tradition. The all important difference, 
however, is that intelligence is perceived here as a moral agency par 
excellence and the intelligentsia is cast as a social force whose mission is 
not to drag the unwilling society along the preordained historical path but 
to ameliorate it via public discourse and personal example. "Jesus Christ," 
suggested one of the participants in the ongoing debate about the 
intelligentsia, "was in essence a prototype of the intelligent." [146] The 
latter is akin to an individual who is "born again" and who strives to be 
righteous himself rather than to impose a particular scheme on society 
(from which it follows that "to call oneself an intelligent is like giving 
oneself a medal" [147] ). This and similar statements have familiar 
messianic overtones, but they are also refreshing insofar as their critical 
thrust is directed at oneself rather than others. Note, however, that the 
intelligentsia's commitment to moral means did not slow its enlistment in 
government sponsored institutions -- ministries, think-tanks, state 
committees, and other organizations that were in the past closed to 
Russian intellectuals practicing moral intelligence. Russian intellectuals 
took full advantage of the new opportunities. Once intellectuals weaned on 
hatred toward the state found themselves working for it, they discovered 
that their ideals did not mesh easily with the demands of power. As 
Chekhov surmised a century ago, the intelligentsia was hardly immune to 
the ills of Russian bureaucracy, from whose head it had origianlly sprang. 
The way intellectuals in power acted amidst the rough and tumble of 
Russian politics in the Gorbachev's and especially the post-Soviet era, 
changed many minds about the intelligentsia's touted virtues. 
Never before did the intelligentsia enjoy a greater influence in their 
homeland than during the heyday of perestroika. Gorbachev's reforms 
assured intellectuals the right to free speech, unprecedented artistic 
freedom, wide access to the mass media, the chance to be elected to the 
Soviet legislature and to serve in government. In addition to the rights 
commonly found in capitalist societies, Russian intellectuals still benefited 
from the largely socialist system that guaranteed employment to 
everybody, required little work, and subsidized the intelligentsia's creative 
pursuits. Thus, throughout perestroika years, movies continued to be 
shot, books published, concerts given, research projects publicly funded -- 
all this with little regard for the fact that there might have been no market 
for the resulting products. No wonder perestroika received such accolades 
from the intelligentsia. "There is no doubt," wrote in 1989 Nathan 
Edelman, a well-known Russian historian, "that the intellectuals' support 
for perestroika is virtually unanimous." [148] Obviously, things could not 
go on like this for any length of time without a major shake-up. And when 
reality testing began, the intelligentsia's fortunes sunk fast. 
Simply put: glasnost was already perestroika for the intelligentsia. It was 
common for intellectuals giddy from reforms to opine that if they had to 
chose between glasnost and sausage they would not hesitate to go with 
the former and forgo the latter. For economically more vulnerable social 
groups, however, perestroika was less of a promise than a threat 
mounting daily in the ever-harsh economic environment. The perestroika 
movement reached its high-water mark in 1989 when the political forces 
in Russia became increasingly polarized. In 1990, the ideological middle 
ground seemed to evaporate and Gorbachev's political base shrivelled to a 
dangerous point. Whereas his constituents on the left felt irritated by 
Gorbachev's refusal to dismantle the one party state, his constituents on 
the right urged the return to the relative stability provided by the socialist 
economy. A year later, the situation in the country resembled the disarray 
that followed the February 1917 revolution. The communist party 
stalwarts staged a coup against Gorbachev in August 1991, cracking the 
whip one last time to see if the Soviet citizen's old reflexes still worked, 
but it was too late. The failed putsch delayed Gorbachev's exit from the 
political scene by a few months. The Soviet Union hurtled fast into 
oblivion, with nothing left in the tool kit of empire to save it from collapse. 
As the Soviet Union went into a tailspin, Boris Yeltsin, head of the Russian 
Federation , saw an opportunity to force Gorbachev out of his office: there 
was no need for a president in a country that did not exist, he reasoned. 
Most Russians seemed to agree. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
ceased to function, and herewith began a dramatic reversal of fortunes for 
the Russian intelligentsia. 
The tales of woe that befell the intelligentsia in post-Soviet Russia are 
gruesome. The Academy of Science had no money to pay its scholars; 
those who could find employment were leaving the country in great 
numbers starting in the early 90s, while their less known colleagues had 
to look for supplementary employment in the still fragile private sector. 
The artistic unions that in the past supported Russian film makers, actors, 
writers, painters, musicians and others fortunate enough to belong to the 
so-called "creative intelligentsia" had lost their resources and could not 
longer furnish their members with lucrative contracts and commissions. 
Scores of artistic companies, including the world-famous Bolshoy Ballet, 
went into bankruptcy or teetered on the brink. Thick literary journals and 
high-brow newspapers that boasted circulation in the millions during 
perestroika saw their press runs dwindle to a few thousand copies. The 
Russians who used to pride themselves on being a nation of readers, 
theater goers, music lovers, and art exhibit aficionados, seemed to have 
lost interest in high culture, as attested by empty theaters, poorly 
attended shows, unsold books, etc. To add insult to injury, the 
intelligentsia was held responsible for every mishap Russia faced since 
Gorbachev came to power. And of course there was no longer an 
overbearing state to kick around, to blame for the intellectuals' 
misfortunes. The state for which the intelligentsia fought tooth and nail 
was lying in ruins, with the Russian house of intellect buried under its 
rabbles. 
The bitterness that the intelligentsia has harbored toward the authorities 
is welling up again, though this time its animus is directed against itself. "I 
detest being an intellectual," confides Alexander Panchenko, a prominent 
Russian scholar and a public thinker with liberal credentials. [149]Another 
well-known writer, Alexander Ivanov, tells the interviewer who dared to 
address him as an intelligent: "Please do not call me with this disgusting 
word. I never considered myself an intelligent and always viewed this 
term with contempt." [150] If Lenin ever was right, adds Ivanov, it was in 
his assessment of the intelligentsia as the nation's excrement. Sergei 
Govorukhin, a film critic, concurs with this assessment, and so do several 
other writers with the Slavophile leanings and the desire to restore Russia 
's former glory. The anger enciphered in such statements has raised the 
temperature of the debate about the intelligentsia which, sadly, fell into 
the old habit of showering opponents with sarcasm and humiliating 
remarks. It is as if the Russian intellectual culture was suddenly thrown 
back to its beginnings. The situation is hardly helped by the fact that now 
everyone is free to say whatever one wants to say and everybody is 
talking simultaneously without much regard for the opponent or a 
concerted effort to join issues. The bloody confrontation between Yeltsin's 
government and the recalcitrant Russian Parliament in October of 1992 
amplified to a deafening point over-acidulous invectives the Russian 
intellectuals were trading ever since the Soviet Union's demise. The whole 
situation is eerily reminiscent of the emotional malaise that afflicted the 
Russian intelligentsia after each previous revolution and that provoked the 
Vekhi authors' monumental inquiry into the Russian intelligentsia's 
wayward life style. "Nine-tenths of our intelligentsia is afflicted with 
neurasthenia," wrote Mikhail Gershenson, one of the sanest voices in 
Russian intellectual history, whose insight rings true today as it did ninety 
years ago; "there are almost no normal people among us -- everybody is 
acerbic, withdrawn, restless faces contorted in a grimace, either because 
one was crossed or because one was saddened. . . . We infect each other 
with bitterness and have so much saturated the atmosphere with our 
neurasthenic attitudes toward life that a fresh person, say, the one who 
lived for a while abroad, could not help feeling suffocated in our midst." 
[151] 
It is all the more important to discern amidst this din the voices that heed 
Chekhov's call to civility and emotional sanity. Sergei Averintsev, Dmitri 
Likhachev, Marietta Chudakova, Viktor Sheinis, Yuri Levada -- these are 
just a few respected voices among today's intelligentsia which use 
glasnost not to drown the opponents' views but to further dialogue and 
which continue to urge the return to sanity in public discourse. What 
draws these very different authors together is the realization that there is 
more to democracy than constitutional guarantees and representative 
institutions, that civil society begins with civility, that Russia will continue 
on its downward path until its citizens can see that, to paraphrase John 
Dewey, democracy does literally begin at home. Marietta Chudakova's 
article published in Literaturnaia Gazeta on the eve of the Soviet Union 's 
collapse is as good an example of a clear-headed attitude toward the 
current chaotic situation in Russia as you can find in recent literature. 
Chudakova reminds her readers about Olga Fridenberg, a friend of Boris 
Pasternak and a keen student of ancient Greek literature, who had this to 
say about Russian intellectual culture shortly before she died in 1956: 
Everywhere, in all organizations and homes, a nasty squabble [ skloka] is 
raging on, the poisoned fruit of our social order, a new concept hitherto 
unknown to civilization and untranslatable into any other language. It is 
hard to explain what it really is: a mean-spirited, petty rivalry, venomous 
factionalism that sickens all against each, an unscrupulous envy that 
breeds endless intrigues. It is sycophancy, libel, informers, the desire to 
unseat the rival, deliberate feeding of ugly passions, nerves perpetually 
set on edge, and moral degeneration that makes a person or a group run 
amok. Squabble is a natural state for people who are rubbing against each 
other in a dungeon, helpless to resist the dehumanization they have been 
subjected to. Squabble -- is the alpha and omega of our politics. Squabble 
-- is our methodology. [152] 
The irritability, intolerance, and aggressive demeanor obvious today, 
Chudakova argues, stem from the old habits intellectuals are unable to 
shed. Now that the ideological husks are peeled away, the raw anger and 
bitterness are no longer hiding under the veneer of respectability and 
politeness. The difference between the past and present discourse, 
according to Kama Ginkas, a stage director, is the same as between "a 
philosophical chat at a fire-side and philosophizing with your thumbs 
slammed in door jambs." [153] The need to pour the bitter irony and 
sarcasm on the opponent is even more painfully obvious today than in 
Russia 's recent past. Rassadin calls it "slovenly irony," Poliakov laments 
"the total ironism" pervading today's Russian culture, and Shvedov decries 
"endless jocularity, coy and empty irony" filling the pages of literary 
magazines. [154] Add to this the devastating impact that market pursuits 
have had on old friendships, the loss of relatives, colleagues, and friends 
to emigration, the precipitous decline in public's interest in high culture, 
persistent economic uncertainty, anti-intellectualism fanned by the 
political right -- and you will have the picture of a malaise that plagues the 
intelligentsia's psyche. [155] It is as if someone suddenly removed 
ferment from the perestroika brew, causing the drink to go sour and 
giving imbibers a monstrous headache. Intercut with the feeling of 
bitterness wide-spread among the Russian intelligentsia today is the 
nostalgia for the good-bad-old days before perestroika when its members 
knew exactly what they were fighting against and for, when people clung 
onto every word uttered by an artist, when there was hope. The empire's 
vices, including the hated censorship, the necessity to speak an Aesopian 
language and create with no chance to have an audience, now appear to 
some to be hidden virtues. [156] Not surprisingly, Alexander Pushkin's 
verse on Pindemonti is quoted ad nausea, its author is portrayed as 
"perhaps the freest man in Russia 's entire history," [157] and his "secret 
freedom" is touted as the last refuge of the intelligent. 
Is this the beginning of the end for the Russian intelligentsia, as many 
authors inside and outside Russia argue? After all, this ideological order 
has accomplished its main goals: the overbearing Russian state is cut 
down to size, political absolutism is broken, glasnost reigns supreme, and 
Russia is firmly set on its path toward political modernization. As a 
historical force bearing the birthmark of its premodern origins, the 
intelligentsia must yield the center stage to make room for professional 
politicians, market-conscious artists, and state bureaucrats. But its 
historical mission has not been accomplished yet. There is still the 
unfinished agenda of psychological modernization, of developing civic 
culture that the intelligentsia has to take up, and that calls for moral as 
well as emotional intelligence. 
Georgy Fedotov saw silence, quietude, holding back one's feelings as a 
signature trait of Russia 's spirituality. [158] Much of what is valuable in 
Russian culture, he maintained, comes from this emotional and intellectual 
wound-up already evident in early Russian monks. As I have tried to show 
in my chapter, such voicelessness has a darker side. For much too often it 
has been an involuntary, forced silence that deprived humans 
of glasand glasnost, drove their negative feelings inside, and turned their 
anguish on themselves and others. The emotional abuse that Russian 
intellectuals casually heap on each other these days is a sure sign that 
they and their predecessors were themselves abused. All those who had 
gone through Stalinist purges, were intimidated by the KGB, witnessed 
ideologically inspired violence could not help being deeply troubled by 
their experiences. The Russian intelligentsia's frustrations go back for 
centuries and are fuelled by an intellectual culture whose participants had 
their feet to the fire until they agreed to say things repugnant to their 
conscience. Herein lies the hidden cesspool fouling Russia 's intellectual 
life. 
Contrary to the intellectuals' belief that Pushkin was the freest man in 
Russia and that his "secret freedom" is all that the true intelligent needs 
to be happy, Pushkin was a troubled man who was badly hurt by others 
and in turn hurt many people about him. His inner freedom underscored 
his longing for basic rights -- to express oneself, to move freely, to choose 
his own fate -- the birthmark longing of a Russian intellectual. B. 
Kistiakovsky, one of the Vekhi authors, exposed the intelligentsia's 
tendency to juxtapose inner freedom and legal liberty nearly a century 
ago: "But inner freedom, immediate spiritual freedom, can be realized 
only under the conditions of external freedom -- the latter is the best 
school for the former." [159] The disregard for human rights and legal 
guarantees breeds moral maximalism, rabid intellectualism, and emotional 
violence. Common among Russian intellectuals, these qualities reflect a 
country disfigured by absolutism, a country which drags its people into 
distorted communications against their will, forces them to say things they 
do not mean and cover up their insincerity by irony and sarcasm. No 
intellectual prowess makes up for deficient emotional intelligence in 
everyday settings; no concern for the well-being of humanity justifies 
callousness toward people in our immediate surroundings; no inner 
freedom exonerates a person from the responsibility for his conduct; no 
ethical commitment absolves one from the need to respect law. When 
these common sense precepts are routinely violated, the community 
suffers, everyone is in distress. 
The collective howling we hear today in Russia bears more than a fleeting 
resemblance to the post-traumatic stress syndrome common among 
people who went through harrowing experiences and who failed to come 
to grips with what they felt at the time because their feelings were 
deemed to be worthless and politically incorrect. Russian intellectual 
culture continues to evolve; there is much in it that is precious; it contains 
models of rational, moral, and emotional intelligence that could help 
Russian intellectuals rid themselves of the regnant obsessions and find the 
via media between facile intellectualism and emotional excess. The 
direction in which Russian intellectual culture has been evolving in the last 
few years, however, gives a cause for concern. It might not be indicative 
of the nation's long-term future, but it is sure to complicate the healing 
process. Still, the very fact that intellectuals are finally free to express 
their feelings, however distorted these might be, is progress. Everything 
that helps bring these pent-up feelings into the open and channel them 
into an intelligent discourse should be welcome. The agenda for the day is 
to focus the intelligentsia's attention on its own emotional life, to help it 
comprehend the distorted communications behind Russian intellectual 
culture, to make it understand that democracy is also a certain quality of 
experience, a socio-psychological culture outside of which democratic 
institutions could not sink roots and are sure to wilt away. In short, one 
has to balance intellect with emotional intelligence and see to it that our 
emotions are intelligent and our intellect is emotionally sane. [160] 
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